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Although soc ia l  c o n f l i c t s  a r e  exper ienced  i n  a l l  s o c i a l  o r d e r s ,  t h e  o u t c o m e  of 
s u c h  c o n f l i c t s  d i f f e r s  f r o m  o n e  s o c i a l  o r d e r  to  a n o t h e r . .  C o n t r a r y  t o  Marx ' s  
predict ion,  soc i a l  r e v o l u t i o n s  h a v e  n o t  o c c u r e d  i n  t h e  c o r e  c a p i t a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s . .  
Ra the r ,  t h e s e  soc i e t i e s  have  been  cha rac t e r i zed  by va ry ing  d e g r e e s  of soc ia l  reforms,  
whereas  i t  h a s  b e e n  T h i r d  Wor ld  s o c i e t i e s  t h a t  h a v e  e x p e r i e n c e d  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
upheavals..' T o  s o m e  e x t e n t  r e f o r m s  in  t h e  c o r e  a n d  revolu t ions  i n  t h e  periphery a r e  
i n t e r r e l a t ed ,  s ince  t h e y  a r e  p a r t s  of  s i n g l e  w o r l d  s y s t e m . .  : O n  t h e  o n e  hand ,  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  p r e e m i n e n c e  of  c o r e  count r ies  i n  t h e  wor ld  sys t em m a k e s  possible soc ia l  
re forms,  t h e r e b y  d i f fus ing  i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t s .  ' In  t h e  p e r i p h e r y ,  h o w e v e r ,  f o r e i g n  
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d o m i n a t i o n  u n d e r m i n e s  l o c a l  a t t e m p t s  a t  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  t h u s  f u e l i n g  s o c i a l  
revolutions.. . A n  unders tanding  of t h e  loca t ion  of d i f f e r e n t  s o c i e t i e s  within t h e  world 
sys tem is  necessary  t o  begin  a n  analysis  of d i f f e ren t i a l  pol i t ical  development. .  But a 
! 
m o r e  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t  a n d  i t s  o u t c o m e  - - r e f o r m ,  r e v o l u t i o n  o r  
repression--is t h e  s t u d y  soc ia l  s tructures. .  ' 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y  e v e n  t h e  b e s t  works in t h e  f i e ld  h a v e  devo ted  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
social  s t ruc ture . .  R e c e n t  works  by Barrington Moore a n d  Theda  Skocpol  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  
o v e r s i g h t . ;  Barr ington Moore's l a t e s t  book, Injust ice,  ra i ses  i m p o r t a n t  and  in t e re s t ing  
issues r ega rd ing  co l l ec t ive  act ion. .  His  a n a l y s i s  c o n f i r m s  t h a t  h u m a n  s u f f e r i n g  b y  
i t se l f  is n o t  su f f i c i en t  t o  g e n e r a t e  co l lec t ive  act ion. .  . Although Moore  ana lyzes  s o m e  
of t h e  condi t ions  which  a l t e r n a t i v e l y  s t i f l e  o r  e n c o u r a g e  o p p r e s s e d  g r o u p s  t o  act  
t o g e t h e r  i n  t h e  h o p e  o f  o v e r c o m i n g  i n j u s t i c e ,  h e  l a rge ly  ignores  soc ia l  s tructure. .  
Where h e  does  d e a l  w i t h  s t r u c t u r a l  issues such  as division within t h e  dominant  c l a s ses  
o r  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  ou t s ide  a g i t a t o r s  in  revolu t ionary  change ,  t h e  analysis  lacks  new 
dimensions.. . Moore i s  t o  b e  lauded f o r  rais ing fundamen ta l  issues, bu t  his analysis  of 
social conf l ic t  and col lect ive  act ion needs t o  be ca r r i ed  further..  
In contras t ,  Theda Skocpol, in her book S ta tes  and Social Revolutions, proposes t o  
develop a s t ruc tu ra l  theory of revolution, arguing t h a t  " the  key t o  successful analysis 
- l i e s  i n  a f o c u s  on ' s ta te  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a n d  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  b o t h  t o  in ternat ional  
environments and t o  domest ic  classes and economic conditions" ~[p.. 29 1). . Specifically, 
Skocpol  v i e w s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r e s s u r e s  and upper c lass  res is tance against  reform as  
cen t ra l  f a c t o r s  leading t o  t h e  collapse of adminst ra t ive-mil i tary  a p p a r a t u s  which  in  
turn paves t h e  way for  social  revolution (p.; 50). 
Skocpol's analysis seems  t o  suffer  from t h r e e  problems.. . T h e  f i r s t  concerns upper 
c l a s s  res i s t anc ' e  t o  state reform.. : The spli t  be tween  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  upper 'class, she 
-claims,  is a main condition f o r  revolution.. , According t o  Skocpol, state managers and 
t h e  upper c lass  a r e  polarized.. However, this is no t  always t h e  c a s e  in contemporary 
revolutions; on t h e  contrary ,  s e g m e n t s  of t h e  u p p e r  c l a s s  h a v e  usua l ly  c o n t i n u e d  
I s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  e x i s t i n g  r e g i m e  t o  t h e  end.. Even where  dissident e lements  of t h e  
upper c lass  have joined t h e  opposition, thei r  in tent ion is o f ten  t o  bring about reform 
ra ther  than revolution. 
I .  
- Another troubling f e a t u r e  of Skocpol's analysis revolves around t h e  collapse of . t h e  
military-administrative apparatus.  For social revolutions t o  occur,  this  collapse must 
I u l t i m a t e l y  t a k e  place. .  . Skocpol  mainta ins  t h a t  ex te rna l  pressures such as  wars or 
I confl icts  between t h e  upper class and t h e  state a r e  t h e  m e c h a n i s m s  by which  t h i s  
b r e a k d o w n  o c c u r s .  ' F u r t h e r m o r e ,  s h e  a r g u e s  t h a t  pr ior  weakening o r  collapse of 
milit-ary-administrative appara tus  is  necessary before  m a s s  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  a c t i o n  c a n  
emerge. However, t h e  revolutionary experiences of Third World countries reveal tha t  
neither of these  two  conditions need exist  for a revolution t o  o c c u r .  ' Autonomous ,  
s t rong c lass  coalitions have brought down Third World governments and s t a t e s  in t h e  
absence of prior weakening or collapse of military appara tus .  T h e  c o l l a p s e  of t h e  
C u b a n  a r m y  at  t h e  e n d  of 1958 was n e i t h e r  d u e  t o  d e f e a t  in  external  war nor 
c o m p l e t e  upper  c lass  defect ion. .  Popular  upr is ing ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  d e f e a t  i n  w a r ,  w a s  
responsible fo r  revolut ion in  Iran and  Nicaragua--in Nica ragua  a r m e d  s t rugg le  played a 
m u c h  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  ro l e  i n  t h e  f ina l  s tage ;  t h e  s a m e  would have  happened in  Iran, 
as i t  w a s  shown i n  t h e  l a s t  days  of t h e  Shah's rule,  had  t h e  s t rugg le s  had cont inued a 
l i t t l e  longer. '  
A th i rd  c r i t ic i sm c a n  be  d i r e c t e d  toward  Skocpol's t heo ry  of t h e  autonomy of t h e  
s t a te .L .  If t h e  s tate  i s  l a r g e l y  a u t o n o m o u s ,  as s h e  c l a i m s ,  s o c i a l  r e f o r m s  t h a t  
presumably  s e r v e  soc i e t a l  i n t e r e s t s  could be  c a r r i e d  o u t  desp i t e  upper c lass  resis tance. .  
Theore t i ca l ly ,  au tonomous  states should b e  l e s s  c o n s t r a i n e d  b y  u p p e r  c l a s s  v e s t e d  
in t e re s t s ,  espec ia l ly  w h e r e  t h e  upper c lass  i s  d isorganized  a n d  weak..  ' But in  t h e  r ea l  
world, states va ry  in  t he i r  re la t ionship  wi th  t h e  d o m i n a n t  classes. .: Only low levels  of 
au tonomy hinder  t h e  c a p a c i t y  of t h e  state t o  e f f e c t  reform.. Skocpol's asser t ion  t h a t  
states a r e  genera l ly  au tonomous  confuses  ou r  unders tanding  of revolut ionary processes.. 
A l t h o u g h  M o o r e  a n d  S k o c p o l  h a v e  e a c h  broken new ground i n  the i r  s tudies  of 
co l l ec t ive  a c t i o n  a n d  soc ia l  revolut ion,  t h e i r  works  s u f f e r  f rom a l a c k  of a t t e n t i o n  t o  
s t r u c t u r a l  f e a t u r e s  of  s o c i a l  conf l ic t . .  ' In t h e  r e m a i n d e r  of t h i s  paper,  I will f i r s t  
p re sen t  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t h e o r y  co l l ec t ive  a c t i o n  a n d  r e v o l u t i o n  a n d  t h e n  a p p l y  i t  t o  
four  case studies.: 
I An  A l t e r n a t i v e  Theore t i ca l  Model 
I 
I 
I A n  a l t e r n a t i v e  t h e o r y  o f  revolut ion m u s t  n o t  only  spec i fy  t h e  condit ions which 
1 e f f e c t  fundamen ta l  change ,  b u t  m u s t  a l s o  p r e d i c t  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  
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I absence  of revolution.. Social  revolut ions a r e  bu t  o n e  o u t c o m e  of social  con f l i c t  and  
I in jus t ice ,  and  analys ts  m u s t  s p e c i f y  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  g e n e r a t e  o t h e r  r e su l t s . .  
Under  w h a t  condit ions do  human beings join t o g e t h e r  t o  bring pa r t i a l  o r  fundamen ta l  
I changes? Al terna t ive ly ,  under  w h a t  s i tua t ions  d o  aggr i eved  groups g r a n t  inevi tab i l i ty  
t o  t h e i r  s u f f e r i n g ?  When d o  t h e  a g g r i e v e d  e n d  u p  b l a m i n g  themselves  o r  o t h e r  
v ic t ims  f o r  t h e i r  suf fer ing?  
T o  answer  t h e s e  b road  quest ions,  I will ana lyze  t w o  i m p o r t a n t  fac tors :  f i r s t ,  t h e  
l ink  b e t w e e n  poli t ical-economic s t r u c t u r e s ,  and  s e c o n d ,  t h e  l e v e l  of  s o l i d a r i t y  a n d  
c o n s o l i d a t i o n  a m o n g  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d  groups.. ' T o  begin, soc ia l  s t r u c t u r e s  vary  in  
t h e i r  d e g r e e  of  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a n d  r e v o l u t i o n . .  In  c a p i t a l i s t  
s o c i e t i e s  w h e r e  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  d i f f e ren t i a t ed ,  revolut ionary 
co l l ec t ive  a c t i o n  i s  less  l ikely t o  occur.. ' O n  t h e  o t h e r  hand, soc i e t i e s  wi th  i n t e g r a t e d  
poli t ical  a n d  economic  s t r u c t u r e s  t e n d  t o  b e  m o r e  vulnerable  t o  co l l ec t ive  a c t i o n  and  
revolution..  By i n t e g r a t i o n  of  p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e s ,  I m e a n  d i r e c t  state 
in t e rven t ion  i n  t h e  process  of a l loca t ion  and  accumula t ion  of capi ta l ;  d i f fe rent ia t ion ,  
in  con t r a s t ,  impl ies  t h e  a b s e n c e  of such  involvement..  Concerning  t h e  second f ac to r ,  
i t  is u s u a l l y  t h e  case t h a t  w i t h o u t  c o n s o l i d a t i n g  a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  a u t o n o m o u s  
organiza t ions  t o  mobi l ize  and  coord ina t e  t he i r  resources ,  d isadvantaged groups canno t  
launch e f f e c t i v e  s t rugg le  aga ins t  t h e i r  adversaries .  ' By levels  of consolidat ion,  I r e f e r  
t o  t h e  proport ion of populat ion t h a t  i s  bo th  d isadvantaged a n d  o r g a n i z e d  i n  a bloc. .  
T a b l e  1 p r e s e n t s  a s c h e m a t i c  v iew of t h e  re la t ionship  be tween  leve ls  of political- 
e c o n o m i c  in tegra t ion ,  leve ls  of consolidat ion of t h e  a d v e r s e 1  y a f f e c t e d  g r o u p s  a n d  
t h e i r  possible outcomes..  ' 
I I 
I I s h a l l  a r g u e  t h a t  r e l a t i v e  i n a c t i o n  is h i g h l y  l i k e l y  w h e n  t h e  l e v e l s  of  
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consolidat ion and  poli t ical-economic in t eg ra t ion  a r e  bo th  low. .. '  Under  s u c h  conditions, 
soc ia l  problems and  su f f e r ing  a r e  mos t ly  expe r i enced  a n d  def ined  as problems on t h e  
I l eve l  of t h e  individual. ..' A s  a resul t ,  v i c t imized  individuals  t e n d  t o  d i r e c t  t he i r  r a g e  
a g a i n s t  t h e m s e l v e s  o r  o t h e r  victims.. T h e  t a r g e t  of a t t a c k  h e r e  i s  n o t  t h e  poli t ical  
s t r u c t u r e  which consequent ly  r ema ins  i n t a c t .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  hand, s e g m e n t e d  conf l i c t  
occu r s  where  t h e r e  is a high d e g r e e  of in tegra t ion  a n d  a low level  of consolidation.. 
S e g m e n t e d  conf l i c t  o f t e n  involves p r o a c t i v e  s t r u g g l e s  s u c h  as s t u d e n t  m o v e m e n t s ,  
g u e r r i l l a  w a r f a r e ,  and  s t rugg le s  f o r  autonomy.. Segmen ted  conf l i c t s  m a y  a l so  r e su l t  
f r o m  defens ive  g r i evances  s u c h  as r ises in  t axa t ion  o r  food prices.. . Because  t h e y  a r e  
s e g m e n t e d ,  t h e y  c a n  b e  r e p r e s s e d  o r  m a d e  inef fec t ive . ,  . Social  re form m a y  r e su l t  
f r o m  a high l eve l  of consol ida t ion  in .combinat ion w i t h  a l o w  l e v e l  of i n t e g r a t i o n . .  
U n d e r  s u c h  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  i ssues  of conf l ic t  t e n d  t o  r e m a i n  economic ,  and  non-zero 
s u m  g a m e ,  t h u s  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s  w i l l  r e m a i n  
u n c h a l l e n g e d . ,  F i n a l l y ,  h i g h  l e v e l s  of c o n s o l i d a t i o n  a l o n g  w i t h  a high d e g r e e  of 
poli t ical-economic in t eg ra t ion  i n c r e a s e  t h e  likelihood of  r evo lu t iona ry  c o n f l i c t s .  w h e n  
s tate  p o l i c i e s  h a v e  p o l a r i z e d  t h e  s o c i e t y . .  T h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of poli t ical-economic 
s t r u c t u r e s  m a k e  t h e  s tate v u l n e r a b l e  t o  a t t a c k  b y  c o l l e c t i v i t i e s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
consol ida ted  to s e i z e  state power and  e f f e c t  fundamen ta l  change..  
Leve l s  of Poli t ical-economic in t eg ra t ion  
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Low 
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T o  c l a r i fy  t h e  logic  of t h i s  theory,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  v a r i o u s  f o r m s  of  
p o l i  t i c a l - e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e  will be  presented  a long  w i t h  t h e i r  impl ica t ions  f o r  t h e  
likelihood of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n . .  ' S e c o n d l y  t h e  e f f e c t  of  s o l i d a r i t y  s t r u c t u r e s  o n  
co l l ec t ive  a c t i o n  will  be  analyzed..  The  paper  will conc lude  wi th  s o m e  illustrations..  ' 
Socia l  S t r u c t u r e s  and  t h e  Transparency of t h e  Socia l  Or ig ins  of In jus t ice  
F o r  co l l ec t ive  a c t i o n  t o  occu r ,  t h e  causes  of su f f e r ing  mus t  be  viewed as soc ia l  
(or  human)  and  consequent ly  a m e n a b l e  t o  change  ... As Moore (1978, 455) has  put  it: 
"It is n o t  t h e  ob jec t ive  su f f e r ing  t h a t  i s  t h e  ma in  c a u s e  of mora l  a n g e r ;  i t  i s  t h e  
a p p a r e n t  s o c i a l  cause . .  . T o  p e r c e i v e  t h e  causes  as human i s  a necessa ry  f i r s t  s t e p  
t o w a r d  doing someth ing  a b o u t  human misery  a n d  injustice". Blaming f a t e ,  t h e  gods, 
o t h e r  v i c t i m s  o r  oneself  will  inhibi t  t h e  development  of a s e n s e  of in jus t ice  a n d  thus  
i m p e d e  co l l ec t ive  ac t ion ,  e v e n  i n  t h e  f a c e  of e x t r e m e  misery  ...' Hence ,  d isadvantaged 
groups  need  t o  iden t i fy  a c o n c r e t e  social  c a u s e  respons ib le  f o r  t h e i r  su f f e r ing  in o r d e r  
t o  polar ize  and  engage  i n  co l l ec t ive  action..  . 
T h e  f o c u s  of s u c h  a t t a c k s  h a s  v a r i e d  widely.. When d i r e c t e d  aga ins t  spec i f i c  
t a r g e t s  i n  t h e  p r iva t e  s p h e r e  such  as landlords  a n d  m e r c h a n t s ,  t h e  r e s u l t  h a s  b e e n  
l a n d  r e f o r m  o r  c h a n g e s  i n  commodi ty  pr ices . . '  But  when t h e  e n t i r e  state appa ra tus  
c o m e s  u n d e r  a t t a c k  as t h e  s o u r c e  of i n j u s t i c e  a n d  s u f f e r i n g ,  t h e  s o c i a l  m a y  
expe r i ence  revolu t ionary  transformation. .  
Whether  a soc ie ty  will  expe r i ence  r e fo rm o r  revolu t ion  depends  on t h e  c h a r a c t e r  
of t h a t  soc i a l  order .  D i f f e r e n t  soc ia l  s t r u c t u r e s  m a y  obscu re  t h e  connect ion  be tween  
t h e  su f f e r ing  of v i c t imized  groups and t h e  human o r  soc i a l  causes  of t h a t  suffering..  : 
In genera l ,  states t h a t  c a n  p re sen t  a n  i m a g e  of s e rv ing  soc ia l  r a t h e r  t h a n  s e g m e n t a l  
i n t e r e s t s  r e d u c e  t h e  l ikel ihood of being challenged..  . O n  t h e  o t h e r  hand, states t h a t  
a p p e a r  t o  s e r v e  pa r t i cu l a r  ves t ed  i n t e r e s t s  f o s t e r  i n c r e a s e d  a t t a c k s .  .. In  t h e  r e a l  
world, cap i t a l i s t  states a r e  c a u g h t  up in  a cont inual  round of  cont radic t ions ,  t h e  m o s t  
i m p o r t a n t  of which i s  t h e  necess i ty  of s imultaneously r ep resen t ing  t h e  gene ra l  soc i e t a l  
i n t e r e s t  a n d  p a r t i c u l a r  d o m i n a n t  c l a s s  i n t e r e s t s . .  T h e  state's gene ra l  obl igat ions 
inc lude  po ro tec t ing  aga ins t  e x t e r n a l  a g g r e s s i o n ,  m a i n t a i n i n g  p e a c e  a n d  o r d e r ,  a n d  
p r o v i d i n g  f o r  t h e  m a t e r i a l  s e c u r i t y  of i ts  s u b j e c t s ;  of p a r t i c u l a r  conce rn  i s  t h e  
m a i n t e n a n c e  of c l a s s  dominat ion  a n d  s e t t i n g  condi t ions  f o r  cap i t a l  accumula t ion .  T h e  
. w a y s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  state d e a l s  w i th  t h e s e  o f t e n  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  t a s k s  have  a profound 
i m p a c t  upon t h e  e c o n o m i c  s i tua t ion ,  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  i n t e n s i t y  of c l a s s  
struggle..  Thus it i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  s tudy t h e  in t e r sec t ion  b e t w e e n  state and  economy., 
In  c a p i t a l i s t  s y s t e m s ,  state p o l i c i e s  m a y  a f f e c t  c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  
a c c u m u l a t i o n  i n  a v a r i e t y  of ways.. With r ega rd  t o  t h e  likelihood of cha l lenge  and  
a t t a c k  aga ins t  t h e  state, at l e a s t  t h r e e  d is t inc t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  e m e r g e :  1) t h e  s tate 
m a y  a v o i d  a n y  s y s t e m a t i c  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and  al low m a r k e t  f o r c e s  t o  ope ra t e ;  2) t h e  
state m a y  indi rec t ly  i n f luence  t h e  economy i n  o rde r  t o  "defend" i t  aga ins t  r e c u r r e n t  
crises s u c h  as r e c e s s i o n s  a n d  d e p r e s s i o n s ;  3) t h e  s tate m a y  d i r e c t l y  e n g a g e  i n  
e c o n o m i c  ac t iv i t i e s ,  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  p r o m o t e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  a n d  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  b y  
cont ro l l ing  resource  al locat ion.  * 
Although t h e  above  c lass i f ica t ion  r e f e r s  t o  i dea l  types,  i t  c a n  b e  s e e n  t o  r e f l e c t  
his torical  a n d  ex i s t i ng  cases fa i r ly  closely. T h e  f i r s t  t y p e  r o u g h l y  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  
n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  p o l i c y  o f  " l a i s s e z  f a i r e "  in Western  soc ie t ies ;  t h e  second t y p e  
r e f l e c t s  roughly t h e  condi t ion  exis t ing  t o d a y  in  t h e s e  s a m e  countr ies .  T h e  th i rd  t y p e  
r ep resen t s  t h e  condit ions of t h e  present ly  "developing" cap i t a l i s t  societies..  
Of  t h e s e  t h r e e  types,  t h e  la i ssez  f a i r e  s y s t e m  is t h e  l e a s t  l i k e l y  t o  e n g e n d e r  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  co l l ec t ive  a c t i o n  because  of t h e  l ack  of d i r e c t  and  t r a n s p a r e n t  l inkage  
b e t w e e n  t h e  poli t ical  and  e c o n o m i c  inst i tut ions.  In t h e  f i r s t  place,  e c o n o m i c  conf l i c t s  
a n d  i n e q u a l i t i e s  d e r i v i n g  f r o m  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a r k e t  c a n n o t  b e  e a s i l y  
a r t i c u l a t e d  i n t o  poli t ical  i ssues  because  of t h e  a b s t r a c t ,  and  d e p o l i t i c i z e d  n a t u r e  of  
e c o n o m i c  t r a n s a c t i o n s . : .  In m a r k e t  economies  buyers  and  se l le rs  of a l l  commodi t ies ,  
including human labor  power,  a r e  cons idered  legal ly f r e e  a n d  e q u a l  i n d i v i d u a l s  a n d  
groups and,  as such  "voluntarily" e n t e r  i n t o  a n y  c o n t r a c t s  t h e y  choose. .  T o  economic  
ac to r s ,  t h e  m a r k e t  a p p e a r s  as a set of ob jec t ive  condi t ions  within w h i c h  t h e y  m u s t  
work, and  which t h e r e f o r e  c a n n o t  b e  at tacked. .  Moreover,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  m a r k e t  
occasionally c a u s e s  mis fo r tune  f o r  c e r t a i n  wea l thy  c a p i t a l i s t s  adds  t o  t h e  i l l u s i o n  of 
t h e  impar t i a l i t y  of t h e  m a r k e t  s y s t e m  itself. .  Consequent ly  t h e  impersonal  n a t u r e  of 
m a r k e t  s y s t e m s  obscures  t h e  soc ia l  or ig ins  of  h u m a n  s u f f e r i n g  a n d  i n j u s t i c e ,  t h u s  
reducing t h e  likelihood of co l l ec t ive  action..  
Secondly, fo r  revolu t ionary  s i tua t ions  t o  a r i se ,  t h e  who le  state a p p a r a t u s  mus t  be  
ca l led  i n t o  question. But  w h e r e  t h e  economic  s y s t e m  i s  managed  a n d .  d i r ec t ed  by a 
"self regulat ing" marke t ,  t h e  likelihood of revolu t ionary  chal lenge  i s  sharply r educed . .  
In such  soc ia l  s t ruc tu re s ,  t h e  state reproduces  t h e  e x t e r n a l  condi t ions  of p r o d u c t i o n ,  
t h e r e b y  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  s y s t e m  as a w h o l e  w i t h o u t  d i r e c t l y  i n t e r v e n i n g  in  t h e  
economic  sphere.  T h e  state c a n  t h e n  c la im t o  s t a n d  a b o v e  a n d  b e y o n d  a l l  s o c i a l  
c l a s s e s ,  s e r v i n g  n o  i n t e r e s t  b u t  t h a t  of t h e  nation..  O n c e  t h e  state c a n  evoke  a n  
i m a g e  of neut ra l i ty ,  it c a n  t h u s  s e r v e  as a n  i n t e g r a t i v e  r a t h e r  t h a n  a divisive force ,  
thereby avoiding a t t a c k  a n d  revolu t ionary  challenge..  
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  r educed  likelihood of co l l ec t ive  a c t i o n  under s u c h  
sys t ems  i s  n o t  due  t o  t h e  a b s e n c e  of suf fer ing  .... T h e  a c t u a l  h is tor ic  expe r i ence  o f  t h e  
West g e n e r a t e d  cons iderable  h u m a n  s u f f e r i n g  t h a t  p r o b a b l y  w a s  u n a v o i d a b l e .  A s  
Polanyi has  argued: "To al low t h e  m a r k e t  mechanism to b e  t h e  s o l e  d i r ec to r  o f .  t h e  
f a t e  of human be ings  a n d  t h e i r  na tu ra l  envi ronment ,  indeed ,  e v e n  of t h e  a m o u n t  and  
use of purchasing power, would r e su l t  in  t h e  demol i t ion  of society..  : F o r  t h e  a l leged  
commodi ty  ' labor power' c a n n o t  b e  shoved abou t ,  used  indiscr iminate ly ,  o r  e v e n  l e f t  
unused, wi thout  a f f e c t i n g  a l s o  t h e  human individual who happens t o  be  t h e  bea re r  of 
t h i s  peculiar  c o m m o d i t y .  In d i s p o s i n g  of m a n ' s  l a b o r  p o w e r  t h e  s y s t e m  wou ld ,  
incidental ly,  dispose of t h e  physical,  psychological,  a n d  mora l  e n t i t y  'man' a t t a c h e d  t o  
t h a t  tag.: Robbed of t h e  p r o t e c t i v e  c o v e r i n g  of t h e  c u l t u r a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  h u m a n  
b e i n g s  would p e r i s h  f r o m  t h e  e f f e c t s  of s o c i a l  e x p o s u r e ;  t h e y  would die as  the  
victims of a c u t e  social dislocation through vice, pe rvers ion ,  c r i m e ,  a n d  s t a r v a t i o n "  
(Polanyi, '1944, p., 73)..-. 
T h i s  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  t h e  process of t h e  r i se  of market  sys tem itself gave 
rise t o  no col lect ive  actio.. ; On t h e  contrary,  a s  Barrington Moore has noted (19661, 
t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  g e n e r a t e d  t r e m e n d o u s  amount  of conflict  and of ten 
collective a c t i o n  i n i t i a t e d  by t h o s e  w h o s e  e s t a b l i s h e d  r i g h t s  a n d  i n t e r e s t s  w e r e  
violated.. : But they did n o t  succeed and marke t  principles eventually prevailed.. Once 
marke t  mechanism was established, c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  w a s  l a r g e l y  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  
specific social  pract ices  r a t h e r  than t h e  whole social  order.. ' 
T h e  second type  of social s t ruc tu re  approximates  t h e  conditions t h a t  already exis t  
in m o s t  W e s t e r n  s o c i e t i e s . .  . T h e  c r i s i s  of t h e  1930 's  l e d  t o  a r e s t r u c t u r i n g  of 
economic sys tems  in t h e  West, f rom limited state involvement in t h e  economy t o  t h e  
pursuit of Keynesian demand-management and social  welfare  policies t o  stabil ize t h e  
macro-economy a n d  e n h a n c e  t h e  e c o n o m i c  s e c u r i t y  of f i r m s  a n d  ind iv idua l s  {(T., 
Weisskopf ,  198 ' S u b s e q u e n t  s t a t e  policies have mostly consisted of a t t e m p t s  t o  
maintain full  employment, control  inflation, and p rov ide  u n e m p l o y m e n t  o r  a c c i d e n t  
i n s u r a n c e  a n d  w e l f a r e  p r o g r a m s  f o r  t h e  u n d e r c l a s s ,  as wel l  a s  a s s i s t i n g  a i l i n g  
industries.. : 
Today Western s t a t e s  vary in the i r  degree  of involvement in  t h e  economy. ... But 
in general, it can  be  a rgued  t h a t  m o s t  W e s t e r n  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  r e m a i n  m o d e r a t e l y  di f ferent ia ted. .  ' The  state does not  significantly 
in tervene in t h e  allocation and accumulation of capital .  . Many state activit ies,  such 
as w e l f a r e  a n d  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  a r e  redistr ibutive r a t h e r  than accumulative.. Even 
state investments  in c e r t a i n  sectors  such as  uti l i t ies and basic  i n d u s t r i e s  in  E u r o p e  
a r e  not  accumulat ive  although they may prove s o  f o r  t h e  private sector..  S t a t e  labor 
. 
l eg is la t ion  a n d  f i sca l -monetary  policy in f luence  t h e  condit ion o f  a c c u m u l a t i o n .  B u t  
t h i s  i s  t h e  r e a l m  of reproduct ion  r a t h e r  t h a n  product ion  and  accumulat ion. .  Overal l ,  
d i r e c t  state in t e rven t ion  i n  cap i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  o c c u r s  w h e n  t h e  m a r k e t  m e c h a n i s m  
- a c t u a l l y  fails.: Thus state in t e rven t ion  i n  t h e  process  of a l loca t ion  and  accumula t ion  
of c a p i t a l  i s  s t i l l  low i n  m o s t  Western countries..  ' 
T h e  l o w  l e v e l  of i n t e g r a t i o n  of  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  has  t w o  
s igni f icant  c o n s e q u e n c e s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  s tate c a n  s t i l l  p r e s e n t  i t s e l f  as a n  e n t i t y  
s e p a r a t e  a n d  independent  of ex is t ing  soc ia l  classes,  t hus  symbolizing t h e  whole soc i e ty  
a n d  se rv ing  t h e  "nat ional  interest" .  The re fo re ,  it c a n  o b s c u r e  t h e  r e a l i t y  of c l a s s  
d o m i n a t i o n . ,  . O n c e  i t  c a n  evoke  such  a n  image ,  t h e  state c a n  e s c a p e  responsibi l i ty 
a n d  avoid  revolu t ionary  chal lenge.  A s  a consequence ,  a l l  social  s t r a t a  c a n  be  given 
f o r m a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  t h e  poli t ical  arena. .  F o r m a l  popular r ep resen ta t ion  in  t u r n  
c r e a t e s  a n  illusion of equal  power a m o n g  a l l  soc ia l  classes.  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  state aga in  
becomes  a n  i n t e g r a t i v e  f o r c e  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  f o c u s  of revolut ionary confl ict . .  
Second,  s ince  labor  and  cap i t a l  s t i l l  r e l a t e  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  p r i m a r i l y  t h r o u g h  t h e  
m a r k e t ,  n o t  t h e  state, t h e  l ikel ihood of revolu t ionary  col lec t ive  ac t ion  aga ins t  t h e  
s tate w i l l  b e  l a r g e l y  r e d u c e d . .  ' U n l i k e  s ta te  s t r u c t u r e s ,  t h e  m a r k e t  c a n n o t  b e  
a t t a c k e d ,  c r i t i c i zed  o r  overthrown., T h e  m a r k e t  r ema ins  a depol i t ic ized  phenomenon. 
Consequen t ly  soc ia l  con f l i c t s  r ema in  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  sphe re  fa l l ing  s h o r t  of 
poli t icizat ion,  and  r a re ly  evolve  i n t o  ideological  con f l i c t s  and  struggles..  : Ins tead  soc ia l  
r e f o r m s  b e c o m e  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  pa th  of development. .  . 
T h e  n a t u r e  of t h e s e  r e f o r m s  a r e  dependen t  on  m a n y  f a c t o r s  such  t h e  c a p a c i t y  of 
t h e  a c t o r s ,  t h e  h is tor ic  development  of t h e  soc i e ty ,  etc. A c e n t r a l  e l emen t ,  however,  
i s  t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e s . .  . T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  
t r anspa rency  of t h i s  link, t h e  m o r e  radica l  migh t  b e  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  reform..  But 
n o  m a t t e r  how r a d i c a l ,  t h e y  r e m a i n  t o  b e  r e f o r m s  because  of t h e  low l eve l s  of 
poli t ical-economic l inkages  i n  m o s t  Western soc ie t ies .  F o r  now r e v o l u t i o n s  a r e  n o t  
t h e  likely alternative.: .  
S o c i a l  r e v o l u t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  p r e v a l e n t  i n  t h e  T h i r d  World..  ' Unlike Western 
count r ies ,  states in  developing soc i e t i e s  have  played a n  a c t i v e  r o l e  i n  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  
a n d  accumula t ion  of capital . .  . Due  t o  t h e  complex  soc i a l  a n d  poli t ical  f ac to r s ,  i n t e rna l  
as well  as ex te rna l ,  t h a t  g a v e  r i s e  to t h e  colonial  exper ience ,  a s t r o n g  commerc ia l -  
i n d u s t r i a l  c l a s s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  d i d  n o t  d e v e l o p  i n  t h e s e  s o c i e t i e s . , '  
D e p r i v e d  of  t h e  a d v a n t a g e s  of c o l o n i a l  e x p l o i t a t i o n ,  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  p o w e r f u l  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  r i s i n g  c o s t s  of in terna t ional  cap i t a l  in  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  
cen tu ry ,  t h e  commercia l - indus t r ia l  c l a s s  r ema ined  w e a k  i n  th i rd  World nat ions.  A s  a 
c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e  state i n  t h e s e  s o c i e t i e s  played a n  in t e rven t ion i s t  ro l e  i n  cap i t a l  
f o r m a t i o n  designed t o  h a s t e n  t h e  indus t r ia l iza t ion  process.. l 
Of  c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  a r e  var ia t ions  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  of state in t e rven t ion  among  Third 
World countr ies .  But  m a n y  of t h e m  h a v e  pursued many  of t h e  fo l lowing s t r a t e g i e s . :  
Many of t h e s e  states inves t  ex tens ive ly  i n  i n f r a s t ruc tu re ,  and  heavy industr ies ,  as well  
as d i r ec t ly  assist t h e  p r iva t e  s e c t o r  in  accumula t ing  capi ta l .  In s o m e  coun t r i e s  state 
i n v e s t m e n t  a c c o u n t s  f o r  as m u c h  as 60 p e r c e n t  of t h e  na t ional  i nves tmen t  (World 
Bank R e p o r t  '.1983). All t h i s  is possible because  of state cont ro l  o v e r  vas t  e c o n o m i c  
r e s o u r c e s  s u c h  as banking, f inancia l  inst i tut ions,  and  r a w  m a t e r i a l  such  as oil.. : T h e  
state no t  only a c c u m u l a t e s  cap i t a l ,  it a l so  a l loca t e s  cap i t a l  t o  t h e  p r iva t e  s ec to r ;  it 
even  e n t e r s  i n t o  joint v e n t u r e s  wi th  p r i v a t e  business.. ' 
In addit ion,  t o  p reven t  m a r k e t  misa l loca t ions  a n d  w a s t e  of r e s o u r c e s ,  states i n  
Thi rd  World count r ies  engaged  a c t i v e l y  in economic  planning, espec ia l ly  t h e  promot ion  
of impor t -subs t i tu t ion  industr ies .  T o  t h a t  e n d ,  g o v e r n m e n t s  h a v e  p u r s u e d  v a r i o u s  
policies such  as t a x  concessions,  subsidized i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  c r e d i t  rat ioning,  quotas  a n d  
l imi t ed  licensing, wage-price cont ro ls ,  t a r i f f  walls  a n d  o v e r v a l u e d  f o r i e g n  e x c h a n g e  
r a t e s  i n  f avor  of state and  l a r g e  p r iva t e  indus t r ia l  corporat ions.  
In genera l  t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  h a v e  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d  v a r i o u s  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s  a n d  
interests.  T h e  widespread neglect  of agriculture in favor  of industry has led  t o  t h e  
deterioration of agriculture.. : In many countries, resources, c red i t  and machinery, a r e  
insufficiently a l located t o  t h e  agra r ian  s e c t o r .  O v e r v a l u e d  c u r r e n c y ,  des igned  t o  
f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  p u r c h a s e  of c a p i t a l  goods  and  m a c h i n e r y ,  r e d u c e s  t h e  v a l u e  of 
agricultural  exports. Food pricing policies combined with government subsidized food 
imports  adversely a f f e c t  agricultural  producers.. ' Even where  t h e  state has moved t o  
improve t h e  agrarian sector ,  iritervention has tended t o  b e  on  t h e  s i d e  of b i g  a n d  
r e s o u r c e f u l  p roducers  at t h e  expense of small cultivators.. . This has resulted in t h e  
growth of income dispari t ies in  t h e  rural sector.  M o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y  t h e s e  po l ic ies  
have widened t h e  income gap  between rural and urban sectors..  ' This in turn  has led 
t o  rapid urbanization. But government emphasis, in mos t  Third World c o u n t r i e s ,  on 
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r y  has not helped absorbing t h e  expanding labor force.. . The 
reserve army along with ever  present government repression against  t h e  working class 
have a c t e d  t o  increase  t h e  capaci ty  of wealthholders t o  augment  the i r  capital.. .. Thus 
growth in income inequality and greater  class polarization. Fur thermore,  state capital  
a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  p r i c e  controls  have not  served small  and medium s ize  firms.. ' Tariff 
walls and l imited licensing have encouraged growth of inefficient  m o n o p o l i e s  a t  t h e  
e x p e n s e  of c o n s u m e r s  f r o m  a l l  c lasses . ,  ' F i n a l l y  t h e  need fo r  rapid accumulation 
impelled led t h e  state and t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  t o  bu i ld  o n  t h e  b e s t  a n d  i n v e s t  in  
r e l a t i v e l y  d e v e l o p e d  regions. .  . Such policies have widened t h e  gap between regions, 
adversely a f fec t ing  e thnic  and racia l  minorities residing in less developed areas. The  
o v e r a l l  r e s u l t s  have been t h e  growth of inequality of wealth and income; all in t h e  
in te res t  of t h e  compradore class.. . 
T h e  p a r i c u l a r  development  has had significant political consequences.. The f i r s t  
result  has been t h e  politicization of economic issues. T h e  integration of political and 
e c o n o m i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  in developing capi ta l is t  socie t ies  has undermined t h e  "invisible 
hand" operat ing in t h e  m o r e  developed marke t  systems, politicizing t h e  e c o n o m y  by 
involving t h e  s t a t e  in economic conflicts.  h he g r e a t e r  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  
t h e  p o l i t i c i z a t i o n . .  . O n c e  t h e  m a r k e t  i s  poli t icized,  victimized .collectivit ies more  
readily identify t h e  s t a t e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n  a b s t r a c t  i n v i s i b l e  m a r k e t  f o r c e ,  a s  t h e  
source of the i r  suffering., ' A second result  i s  t h e  polarization of society ... Once t h e  
state e n t e r s  in to  a di rect  and visible al l iance with major  capital ists ,  t h e  s t a t e  can no 
l o n g e r  c l a i m  t o  s y m b o l i z e  t h e  s o c i e t y  a n d  t h e  "national interest", for  i t  becomes 
obvious t h a t  i t  really serves  part icular interests.  State-compradore al l iances in Third 
World c o u n t r i e s  today have o f ten  led t o  t h e  exclusion of most  of t h e  social classes 
including t h e  national bourgeoisie, t h e  tradit ional  middle class, t h e  working class and 
t h e  peasan t ry . .  A s  a r e s u l t ,  social  support for  t h e  state i s  eroded, in many Third 
World societies,  leaving i t  vulnerable t o  a t tack.  In sum, high levels of revolutionary 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  repress ion,  and political instabil i ty in developing societies can be 
a t t r ibu ted  in l a rge  par t  t o  t h e  integration of political and  economic institutions.. 
Thus  f a r  I h a v e  a n a l y z e d  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  soc ia l  s t ructures  and t h e  
likelihood of collective action,  showing in part icular how cer ta in  social s t ruc tu res  a r e  
m o r e  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a n d  r e v o l u t i o n  t h a n  others.  .. The following 
sect ion will focus  on t h e  capaci ty  of social groups t o  engage in collective action.. . 
Solidarity Structures,  Consolidation and Collective Action 
A s  t h e  a b o v e  d i s scuss ion  d e m o n s t r a t e s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  a n d  t h e  
transparency of the  origins of injustice provide t h e  motives and t a r g e t s  of collective 
action.. However, th is  does no t  te l l  us whether  o r  no t  collective act ion will actually 
t a k e  place.. . T o  be able  t o  act upon the i r  condition of oppression, victimized classes 
o r  c o l l e c t i v i t i e s  n e e d  t o  d e v e l o p  s o l i d a r i t y  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  c a n  m o b i l i z e  t h e i r  
resources, giving them g r e a t e r  s t rength  and  hope t h a t  i t  i s  possible t o  do something 
about  the i r  situation; t o  overcome t h e  sense  of inevitabil i ty of suffering and injustice.. 
T o  achieve this, they need t o  develop: 1) s t rong solidari ty structures,  2) an  e f fec t ive  
communication and resource mobilization network, and 3) some form of coalition with 
o t h e r  c o l l e c t i v i t i e s  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  t h e i r  f o r c e s  t o  c o u n t e r  t h e  p o w e r  of t h e i r  
adversaries. Solidarity theorists ,  such a s  Gamson, Tilly, and Zald maintain t h a t  social 
s o l i d a r i t y ,  meaning t h e  in tegrat ion of individuals i n t o  community l ife,  fac i l i ta tes  t h e  
mobilization process. I t  does so because i t  can provide a common set of values and 
i n t e r e s t s  s h a r e d  by m e m b e r s  of t h e  community, a communication network, and a n  
. . author i ty  s t ruc tu re  providing leadership t h a t  can  m i n i m i z e  f a c t i o n a l i s m .  Thus,  t h e  
g r e a t e r  t h e  solidarity s t ructure ,  t h e  greater  t h e  capac i ty  of the  community t o  claim 
r e s o u r c e s  f r o m  ind iv idua l  m e m b e r s  w h i l e  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  r e d u c i n g  e x i t  a n d  
T h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  i n f l u e n c e s  the  capaci ty  of d i f ferent  groups and classes t o  
mobilize f o r  collective a c t i o n .  In g e n e r a l ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  d e g r e e '  of c o l l e c t i v e  
c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  d i s t r ibu t ion ,  t h e .  g r e a t e r  t h e  cohesion of - t h e  group.. 
St ra t i f ica t ion also influences t h e  degree  of solidarity. The  g rea te r  t h e  s t ra t i f ica t ion 
w i t h i n  t h e  vic t imized group, the  g rea te r  t h e  difficulty of mobilization due t o  a low 
level  of solidarity or cohesion. In contras t ,  t h e  lower t h e  level  of strat if ication,  t h e  
less  t h e  difficulty of mobilization.. . 
F i n a l l y  t h e  n a t u r e  of r e l a t i o n s  between aggrieved groups and the i r  adversaries 
mus t  be considered.. C l e a r l y ,  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  g i v e  r i s e  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a r e  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a high degree  of polarization.. . A high degree  of ver t ica l  cohesion 
b e t w e e n  v i c t i m s  a n d  t h e i r  v i c t i m i z e r s ,  in  c o m b i n a t i o n  w i t h  a high d e g r e e  of 
d e p e n d e n c y  of t h e  f o r m e r  on t h e  l a t t e r ,  may  seriously l imit  polarization.. - If t h e  
v i c t i m i z e d  g roups  o r  c l a s s e s  a r e  n o t  c a p a b l e  of s e v e r i n g  t h e i r  t i e s  t o  t h e i r  
victimizers, no collective act ion can t a k e  place.. . 
A functionalist  approach  would e m p h a s i z e  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of s h a r e d  v a l u e s ,  
b e l i e f s  a n d  ideo log ies ,  a s  s o u r c e s  of stabil i ty t h a t  reduce t h e  propensity t o  break 
f rom t h e  social order and engage in c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  ideo log ies  
I 
a t t e m p t  t o  legi t imize  t h e  exist ing social relat ions in order  t o  secure  t h e  submiss ion  
of the  underlying social  classes.. . On t h e  one  hand, ideologies tend t o  emphasize t h e  
re la t ive  superiori ty of t h e  dominant classes and thei r  g rea te r  contribution t o  societal  
functioning, survival, and progress.. ' On t h e  other,  ideologies tend t o  deny o r  repress 
t h e  f a c t  of s t r u c t u r a l  c o n f l i c t  by e m p h a s i z i n g  h a r m o n y  a n d  o r d e r  t h r o u g h  t h e  
promotion of "higher valuestt such a s  race,  religion o r  nationality.. Finally, they tend 
t o  convey a sense of naturalness and inevitability in  t h e  exist ing social order.. . 
Howevr, most  functional theorists  can neither explain t h e  origins of social values, 
nor t h e  f a c t  of their  change and transformation.  They assume social ine r t i a  and give 
no explanation fo r  it (as though i t  was ail descended from heaven).. . However, the re  
is a grea t  deal  of sociological and historical evidence t h a t  reveals how cer ta in  social 
principles gain hegemony and  a f f e c t  social stability.. Barrington Moore (1966, p. .. 486) 
put the  point brilliantly: 
"The a s s u m p t i o n  of s o c i a l  i n e r t i a ,  t h a t  c u l t u r a l  a n d  social continuity do not  
require explanation, ob l i t e ra tes  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  both  have t o  be  r e c r e a t e d  anew in 
each generation, of ten wi th  g rea t  pain and suffering ...' T o  maintain and t ransmit  a 
v a l u e  s y s t e m  h u m a n  b e i n g s  a r e  punched,  bu l l i ed ,  s e n t  t o  ja i l ,  t h r o w n  i n t o  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  c a m p s ,  c a j o l e d ,  b r ibed ,  m a d e  i n t o  h e r o e s ,  encouraged t o  read 
n e w s p a p e r s ,  s t o o d  u p  a g a i n s t  a wal l  a n d  s h o t ,  a n d  s o m e t i m e s  e v e n  t a u g h t  
sociology.. : T o  speak of cultural  iner t ia  i s  t o  overlook t h e  concre te  in teres ts  and 
privileges t h a t  a r e  served by indoctrination, education,  and t h e  en t i re  complicated 
process of t ransmit t ing cul ture  f rom one generation t o  t h e  next". 
I n d e e d  t h i s  h a s  b e e n  a v e r y  c o m p l i c a t e d  p r o c e s s  a n d  by n o  m e a n s  v e r y  
consensual . .  : F o r c e  a n d  v i o l e n c e  h a v e  played decisive roles in t h e  development of 
human civilization. Under r e p r e s s i v e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  v i c t i m s  of s o c i a l  p r o c e s s e s  f i n d  
themselves incapable of resist ing thei r  adversaries n o t  because of inability t o  conceive 
of a l ternat ive  measures, but  due  t o  t h e  repressive n a t u r e  of es tab l i shed  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
and the  inability t o  do anything about them tha t  i s  t h e  c o r e  of the  problem ... In fac t ,  
t h e  v e r y  e x i s t e n c e  of r e p r e s s i o n  i s  i n d i c a t i v e  of t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a l t e r n a t i v e  
possibilities, at l e a s t  f o r  s o m e  segments  of t h e  population. 
T h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r e p r e s s i o n  d i f f u s e s  w h a t e v e r  a n g e r  v i c t i m s  m i g h t  h a v e  
developed agains t  thei r  vict imizers,  thus reducing t h e  likelihood of col lect ive  ac t ion . .  . 
Unable t o  change the i r  circumstances,  vict imized and  powerless groups might come t o  
abandon the i r  s t ruggle  ((otherwise they may only prolong thei r  s u f f e r i n g ) ;  s o m e  m a y  
e v e n  i m p l i c i t l y  g r a n t  l e g i t i m a c y  t o  a seemingly unalterable exist ing order (Moore, 
1978, p.. 459). In e x t r e m e  cases, some people may even go as f a r  as r e i f y i n g  t h e  
s o c i a l  r e a l i t y ,  f e a r i n g  p e r h a p s  tha t  otherwise t h e  pain and suffering might become 
m o r e  severe  and even intolerable.  Some victims t h e n  may end u p  i d e n t i f y i n g  w i t h  
t h e i r  o p p r e s s o r s ,  r e p r e s s i n g  t h e  o u t r a g e  a n d  humil ia t ion t h a t  emerges  out of t h e  
condition of oppression.. consequent ly ,  t h e  sense  of outrage and ha t red  may collapse 
a n d  t r a n s f o r m  i t s e l f  in to  obedience and submi~s ion .~ . :  Individuals might unconsciously 
tu rn  t h e  repressed rage  inward, resulting in a sense  of infer ior i ty .  A s  l o n g  a s  t h e  
I 
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. aggression i s  d i rected inward or  fateward,  t h a t  i s  toward God and  religious rituals, i t  
I 
no longer poses a t h r e a t  t o  t h e  e x t a n t  social order. ... 
I If t h e  preceding a rguments  a r e  correct ,  then t h e r e  seems  t o  be some degree of 
association between t h e  level  of solidarity within collectivit ies and thei r  capaci ty  t o  
r e c o g n i z e  t h e i r  c o n d i t i o n  of oppress ion  a n d  in jus t i ce . .  T h e  g rea te r  t h e  level of 
solidarity, t h e  g r e a t e r  may b e  t h e  capaci ty  fo r  recognizing t h e  condition of suffering, 
i t s  s o u r c e s ,  a n d  t h e  n e e d  f o r  a remedy . . :  In  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s t r o n g  s o l i d a r i t y  
s t r u c t u r e s ,  g i v e n  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of o r g a n i z i n g  a n d  mobi l i z ing ,  o v e r c o m i n g  t h e  
f r a g m e n t a t i o n  of s o c i a l  l i f e ,  a n d  breaking away  f rom t h e  established social order, 
human beings a r e  likely e i t h e r  t o  repress and d e n y  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of t h e  s u f f e r i n g  
(which r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  functioning of the  social  s t ructure)  or  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  given 
situation a s  inevitable (possibly due  t o  their  own faults), hence fail ing t o  question or  
challenge t h e  prevailing social  order.. 
Thus t o  overcome t h e  power of their  adversaries, challenging groups need t o  build 
coalitions, f o r  without consolidation fundamental  social  change c a n n o t  a c t u a l l y  t a k e  
place. .  . F r a g m e n t e d  c o l l e c t i v i t i e s  m a y  e n g a g e  in protracted conflicts  without any 
results. There fore  consolidation of forces  is a necessary s t e p  toward assuming power., ' 
T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  l e v e l  of c o n s o l i d a t i o n  a m o n g  t h e  adversely  a f f e c t e d  groups, t h e  
g r e a t e r  t h e  likelihood of success  in assuming power. . 
T h e  l ike l ihood  of consolidation increases during economic crisis when a l ternat ive  
options f o r  living and act ion become limited f o r  major  social  groups. Economic crises 
a r e  highly disruptive of modern urban living conditions, challenging established rights 
and  ways of life. They also t end  t o  generate  divisions within t h e  dominant classes o r  
deepen a l ready exist ing ones. 
B u t  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  no te  t h a t  crises si tuations do no t  automatically result  in 
col lect ive  action; they merely  set t h e  s t a g e  f o r  i t .  O n l y  i f  t h e r e  i s  a c l a s s  o r  
colect iv i ty  wi th  a revolutionary conflict, lacking a viable non-violent option, could we 
expec t  collective action. This class, if s t rong  enough, m a y  b e  a b l e  t o  d r a w  o t h e r  
adversely a f f e c t e d  groups i n t o  a coalition. . 
T h i r d  World societies a r e  highly susceptible t o  f requent  economic crises. ' There  
a r e  several  reasons fo r  this. First ,  t h e  economies of these  countries lack resilience 
because of a low level  of accumulation. ' In addition, most Third World societies rely 
heavily on a single c rop  fo r  thei r  t r ade  in  t h e  world market.  As Myrdal has noted, 
I 
I they leave all  the  eggs in o n e  basket.. .F inal ly  these  socie t ies  a r e  highly dependent on 
I ex te rna l  m a r k e t s  an'd f o r i e g n  a id .  T h e i r  r e l i a n c e  o n  s i n g l e  c r o p s  a n d  e x t e r n a l  
I 
d e p e n d e n c e  m a k e s  t h e m  e x t r e m e l y  vulnerable t o  t h e  f luctuations and crises of t h e  
world market..  Given these  c o n d i t i o n s ,  T h i r d  .Wor ld  s o c i e t i e s  t e n d  t o  e x p e r i e n c e  
f requent  economic crises which serve  as a st imulus t o  consolidation., 
T h e  argument  has been advanced  t h a t  low l e v e l s  of p o l i t i c a l  ' i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  
c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  a c c u m u l a t i o n  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  a low l e v e l  of consolidation 
g e n e r a t e  c o n d i t i o n s  highly  c o n d u c i v e  t o  r e l a t i v e  i n a c t i o n .  A d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d  
individuals or groups may largely di rect  thei r  suffer ing against  themselves (accepting 
responsibility and blame), agains t  o ther  victims, or  a c c e p t  i t  as inevitable.. The cause  
of this is t h e  absence of a c l e a r  social or  human origin fo r  thei r  suffering combined 
w i t h  i n a b i l i t y  t o  act col lect ively . .  . Blaming oneself may result  in shame, guilt and 
inferiori ty feelings, which may  in turn  lead t o  a strengthening of t h e  bond b e t w e e n  
t h e  v i c t i m s  a n d  the i r  "superiors" who would be viewed and  respected a s  symbols of 
s t reng th  and virtue. Because of t h e  opaqueness of t h e  causes of suffering, imposed 
upon v i c t i m s  t h r o u g h  t h e  market ,  outrage may  find expression in aggression toward 
outsiders and minorities, culminating in racism and discrimination. A t h i r d  r e s p o n s e  
c a n  b e  s e e n  i n  t h e  growth of religiosity a s  a means  t o  channel individual guilt and 
aggression in condition of helplessness and inevitability.. : 
P o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t s  m a y  b e  weakly expressed under conditions of high political- 
economic integration and low levels of consol idat ion.  H e r e  t h e  i n c a p a c i t y  t o  a c t  
c o l l e c t i v e l y  i s  t h e  m a i n  i m p e d i m e n t . .  - G u e r r i l l a  w a r f a r e ,  under  such conditions, 
i n i t i a t e d  by s m a l l  g r o u p  of r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  m a y  e m e r g e .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  
insti tutional reform i s  more  likely when t h e  social  s t ruc tu re  i s  character ized by low 
level  of i n t e g r a t i o n  a n d  a h igh  l e v e l  of c o n s o l i d a t i o n .  In t h i s  case, e c o n o m i c  
c o n f l i c t s  usua l ly  fa l l  shor t  of politicization because they a r e  handled outside of t h e  
political arena.. . Consequently issues re levant  t o  t h e  to ta l i ty  of t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  
do n o t  ge t  raised in t h e  political sphere.. . Thus politics can only e f f e c t  reforms.. : But 
t h e  r e f o r m s  d o  n o t  e m e r g e  a u t o m a t i c a l l y . .  C r o u p s  t h a t  l a c k  s t r o n g  s o l i d a r i t y  
s t r u c t u r e s  will not  be able  t o  e f f e c t  change., Finally in tense  revolutionary conflicts  
a r e  likely t o  emerge  where t h e r e  is a high l e v e l  of state i n t e r v e n t i o n  in c a p i t a l  
a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  a c c u m u l a t i o n  a n d  a high level of consolidation.. S t a t e  intervention 
politicizes economic issues and  reduces t h e  Likelihood of obscuring t h e  s o c i a l  o r ig ins  
of in jus t ice . .  . Nei ther  marke t  forces  nor f a t e  can be blamed for  social problems or  
t h r e a t s  against  established in teres ts .  More significantly,  s tate i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  i n  t h e  
Third World context ,  of ten polarizes t h e  society, pit t ing t h e  government apparatus  and 
i t s  tiny compradore  ally agains t  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  population.. . If challengers a r e  s t rong 
enough, they c a n  se ize  state power and bring a revolution. Otherwise,  t h e r e  will be 
a per iod  of i n t e n s e  repress ion . .  . T h i s  i s  w h a t  m a n y  T h i r d  World c o u n t r i e s  a r e  
experiencing today.. 
Al though  t h e  a b o v e  t h e o r y  c a n  b e  t e s t e d  i n  a c r o s s  n a t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h ,  a n  
examination of single cases  may b e t t e r  i l luminate . the  argument.  F o r  th is  purpose I 
have chosen t h e  c a s e  of t h e  U.S., Russia, Nicaragua and Iran.. . The United S ta tes  is 
character ized by a f r e e  marke t  economy with a low degree  of state i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  
capi ta l  allocation and a c c ~ m u l a t i o n . ~  : In contras t ,  Tsar is t  Russia presents an example 
of a backward European power a t t empt ing  t o  indust r ia l ize  t h r o u g h  s t a t e  a c t i v i t i e s .  ... 
T h i s  p a t t e r n  of d e v e l o p m e n t  has actually been adopted throughout t h e  Third World 
today. Iran and Nicaragua r e p r e s e n t  t w o  e x a m p l e s  of c o n t e m p o r a r y  -Th i rd  World 
s o c i e t i e s ,  at v a r y i n g  l e v e l s  of d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  potentials, t h a t  have experienced 
fundamental  social revolutions.. 
~ The United S ta tes  
D e s p i t e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of s o c i a l  and economic problems throughout t h e  present 
century,  t h e  likelihood of revolutionary c h a n g e  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  r e m a i n s  v e r y  
slight.. Even t h e  mos t  a c u t e  period of economic hardship during t h e  G r e a t  Depression 
led t o  a ser ies  of reforms, enabling organized labor t o  augment  i t s  sha re  of national 
income l a t e r  in  t h e  post  war  period.. ' Similarlt,  t h e  struggles of blacks in t h e  1960's 
a lso  resulted in  reform, t h e  Voting Rights Act. Revolutionary change i n  t h e  U.S.L i s  
no t  a possibility today despi te  t h e  exis tence of social problems and  economic crisis.. 
Some theor is ts  explain t h e  lack of revolutionary potential  partly in t e r m s  of t h e  
h i g h e r  s t a n d a r d  of l i v i n g  en joyd  by t h e  A m e r i c a n  work ing  c l a s s  a s  a resul t  of 
i m p e r i a l i s m  ( P i v e n  a n d  C l o w a r d ,  '1977,  p.. XI. I m p l i e d  i n  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  i s  a 
comparison between t h e  American s t a n d a r d  of l i v i n g  a n d  t h a t  of o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  
w h e r e  r e v o l u t i o n  h a s  t a k e n  or. might t ake  place.. : Despite t h e  c lear ly  higher living 
s tandard of American workers,  t h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n  c o n t r i b u t e s  l i t t l e  t o  a t h e o r y  of 
r e v o l u t i o n . .  . In  t h e  f i r a t  p l a c e ,  e v i d e n c e  s h o w s  t h a t  t h e  s t a n d a r d  of l i v i n g  i n  
revolutionary Cuba  and Iran was higher than many of t h e i r  n e i g h b o r s  t h a t  d id  n o t  
experience revolution.. ' Generally, numerous historic examples can be c i t ed  t o  suggest  
t h a t  impoverished people do n o t  necessarily engage in collective action.  Tilly (1975) 
h a s  d i s s c u s s e d  t h e  a b s e n c e  of collective act ion in  t h e  cases  of Irish famine in t h e  
n i n e t e e n t h  century a n d  t h e  i m p o v e r i s h e d  s o u t h e r n  I t a l y  i n  the ,  s a m e  period; t h e  
histories of Persia, India 'and China a r e  rep le te  wi th  ins tances  of peasant passivity in 
t h e  f a c e  of e x t r e m e  poverty and  misery.. : 
More important  than t h e  standard of living i s  t h e  way in  which resources, power, 
and privileges, a r e  distr ibuted throughout society. According Les te r  Thurow, with t h e  
e x c e p t i o n  of F r a n c e  p r i o r  t o  t h e  1980, t h e  U.S. h a s  had  t h e  m o s t  inegalitarian 
distribution of wealth and .income among Western nations in  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y .  
. N o t  s u r p r i s i n g l y  t h e  U.S. h a s  a l s o  e x p e r i e n c e d  o n e  of t h e  h i g h e s t  r a t e s  of 
unemployment. A c o n s i d e r a b l e  p o r t i o n  of t h e  A m e r i c a n  p o p u l a t i o n  h a s  l i v e d  i n  
poverty throughout much of t h e  twent ie th  century.. Yet none of these  problems has 
generated a revolutionary condition.. . 
T h e  t h e o r y  a d v a n c e d  h e r e  e x p l a i n s  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t e r m s  of low l e v e l  of 
political-economic in tegrat ion and low leve l  c o n s o l i d a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  s h a r e  of 
g o v e r n m e n t  s p e n d i n g  in  t h e  U.S. has  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  10 percent  in  1940 t o  22.6: 
percent  in 1980, t h e  state h a s  no i n d u s t r i a l  i n v e s t m e n t  of i t s  own,  nor  d o e s  i t  
d i r e c t l y  i n t e r v e n e  in  capi ta l  allocation and accumulation under ordinary conditionns., ' 
Significant economic issues a r e  determined through t h e  market ,  o r g a n i z e d  l a b o r  a n d  
pr ivate  corporations.. ' Occasionally t h e  state choses t o  in tervene defensively in crises 
in  t h e  pr ivate  s e c t o r  such as those  of Chrysler b a i l  o u t  a n d  I l l ino i s  C e n t r a l  Banl; 
however, t h e  level  of in tegrat ion remains low, the reby  inhibiting polarization and t h e  
emergence of a revolutionary situation., 
Although American socie ty  has experienced periods of intense social  conflict, t h e  
t a r g e t  of a t t a c k s  has rarely been t h e  state. .  Confl ic ts  have largely emerged between 
t h e  working c lass  and t h e  industrial  upper class, with t h e  s t a t e  remaining outside of 
m o s t  d i s p u t e s . . :  When t h e  l e v e l  of c o n s o l i d a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a m o n g  
challenging groups, reforms have resulted.. : A brief historical review reveals our point.. . 
Following t h e  Civil War economic development in t h e  U.S.. was primarily achieved 
t h r o u g h  a f r e e  marke t  economy based on t h e  in i t ia t ive  of entreprenuers and private 
enterprises.  In ,1860 t h e  U.S.. :was t h e  world 's  s e c o n d  i n d u s t r i a l  p o w e r w i t h  s o m e  
500,000 business firms.. ' By 1890 t h e  U.S. had a t t a i n e d  f i r s t  place, surpassing England.. . 
Between 1870 and 1920, U.S.. manufacturing output  rose  over  ten-fold, while t h a t  of 
England rose  by less than t h r e e  fold (Bagwell and  Mingay, 1970, 158).. . 
This impressive economic growth was  a c h i e v e d  l a r g e l y  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  of s t a t e  
intervantion.. ' Throughout t h e  nineteenth century,  t h e  U.S. government abstained f rom 
e n g a g i n g  i n  c a p i t a l  a c c u m u l a t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  p l a y e d  s o m e  r o l e  i n  b u i l d i n g  
i n f r a s t r u c t i r e  a n d  c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  i n  t h e  f o r m  of l a n d  g r a n t s  f o r  r a i l r o a d  
construction,  format ion of s e m i -  pub l ic  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  f i n a n c e  i n l a n d  n a v i g a t i o n ,  
turnpikes, banks and insurance., ' Much of this development occured prior t o  t h e  Civil 
War a n d  f a i l e d  t o  s u r v i v e  t h e  pos t  w a r  p e r i o d  w h e n  t h e  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m y  
e x p e r i e n c e d  i t s  m o s t  r a p i d  g r o w t h  and industrialization.. ' A f t e r  t h e  Civil war, t h e  
government imposed a high tariff  t o  protect  northern industry,  t h e r e b y  e n c o u r a g i n g  
accumulation in  ce r ta in  enterprises such as t h e  t inp la te  industry, then in  i t s  infancy. 
By t h e  end of t h e  ninieteenth centuty ,  American technology had ou t s t r ipped  t h a t  of 
E u r o p e  invading t h e  British marke t  with American goods (Bagwell and Mingay, 1970, 
165). Thus t h e  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  p r o c e e d e d  w i t h  m i n i m u m  s t a t e  
intervention in capi ta l  al location and accumulation.. . 
By t h e  end  of t h e  cen tu ry ,  however,  a s igni f icant  sh i f t  i n  s e n t i m e n t  t oward  l i ssez  
f a i r e  policies was  d iscernable  a m o n g  Amer ican  intel l igensia. ,  ' In 1885 a sma l l  band of 
e c o n o m i s t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  A m e r i c a n  E c o n o m i c  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  p r o c l a i m i n g  t h e  
l e g i t i m a c y  of  a "progressive t h e o r y  of regulation". Henry  C a r t e r  Adams,  a Universi ty 
of Michigan professor  and  o n e  of t h e  cofounders  of t h e  AEA, playing a leading  ro l e  - 
i n  t h e  I C C ,  a d v o c a t e d  t h e  ha rmon ious  use  of state power a n d  t h e  ene rg ie s  of t h e  
. e n t e r p r e n u e r  i n  t h e  f u r t h e r  deve lopmen t  of t h e  p r iva t e  economy as a whole. In 1886 
A d a m s  a rgued  t h a t  "....;The col lapse  of f a i t h  i n  t h e  suf f ic iency  of t h e  philosophy of 
l a i s s e z  f a i r e  has  l e f t  t h e  p r e s e n t  g e n e r a t i o n  w i t h o u t  p r i n c i p l e s  a d e q u a t e  f o r  t h e  
guidance  of public  affairs .  ... We a r e  now passing through a period of i n t e r r egum in t h e  
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  con t ro l  of e c o n o m i c  and gove rnmen ta l  principles .... P r i n c i p l e s  of a c t i o n  
w e  m u s t  h a v e ,  f o r  n o t h i n g  i s  s o  m i s c h i e v o u s  as t h e  a t t e m p t e d  so lu t ion  of g r e a t  
ques t ion  o n  t h e  basis  of i m m e d i a t e  i n t e r e s t s  alone" (quoted in  Skowronek, 132).. . 
I t  is n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  e c o n o m i c  t r ans fo rma t ion  a lso  l e d  t o  popular demands  f o r  
s tate i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  e c o n o m y .  A g i t a t i o n  b y  f a r m e r s ,  a n d  m e r c h a n t s  w a s  
i n s t r u m e n t a l  in  t h e  passage of t h e  I n t e r s t a t e  C o m m e r c e  A c t  of 1887, establ ishing t h e  
f i r s t  f e d e r a l  r egu la to ry  agency.  In 1890, an t i -weal th ,  a n t i  big-business s e n t i m e n t s  l e d  
t o  t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  t h e  S h e r m a n  An t i t ru s t  Act.. F o r  t h e  m o s t  par t ,  such  regula t ion  
f a i l e d  t o  cont ro l  big b u s i n e s s  a n d  i n s t e a d  i n  s o m e  w a y s  t h e  a g e n c i e s  w e r e  u s e d  
e f f e c t i v e l y  by t h e  business t o  coord ina t e  t h e i r  indus t r ies  and  s e r v e  t h e i r  own  i n t e r e s t s  
(Heilbroner and  Singer, 1984, 207-21 5). . . 
T h e r e a f t e r  t h e  gove rnmen t  did no t  move  f o r w a r d  i n  business regulat ion; .  a l though 
s o m e  pres idents  m a d e  l imi t ed  a t t e m p t s  t o w a r d  t h a t  d i rec t ion ,  t h e  c o n g r e s s  i m p e d e d  
t h e  c h a n g e s  ( f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  c o n g r e s s  r o l l e d  b a c k  t h e  e x p a n s i o n  of  t h e  
admin i s t r a t ion  a f t e r  World War 1). T h u s  t h e  A m e r i c a n  e c o n o m y  w a s  l e f t  l a r g e l y  
u n r e g u l a t e d . .  : T h e  f a i l u r e  o f  regulat ion der ived  i n  p a r t  f rom t h e  a b s e n c e  of s t r o n g  
admin i s t r a t ive  capabi l i t ies  ~(S. tephen Skowronek, 1982, 121-123). Unlike E u r o p e a n  a n d  
Asian nations t h a t  inheri ted s o m e  form of beaucrat ic  s t a t e s  from thei r  p r e i n d u s t r i a l  
t i m e s ,  t h e  U .S. e n t e r e d  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  e r a  with a weakly developed administrat ive 
capacity.  An additional f a c t o r  was t h e  r e l u c t a n c e  of A m e r i c a n  s tate bu i lde rs  t o  
in tervene in  business affairs;. . 
The plea fo r  regulation of the  business and economy went  unheeded.. In f a c t  t h e  
American industrial  upper c lass  seemed  t o  be a class beyond b e a u r a c r a t i c  controls . ,  
This upper class was so  powerful t h a t  i t  was able  t o  hire i t s  own pr ivate  army, the  
Pinkerton Agency, t o  defend itself against  t h e  working classes. By t h e  e n d  of t h e  
nineteenth century,  t h e  ac t ive  Pinkerton agents  (2000) and  i t s  reseves (30,000) totalled 
m o r e  than t h e  standing a rmy of t h e  U.S..c(Jeremy B r e c h e r ,  1972, 55). T h i s  f o r c e  
along with state mil i t ia  was ab le  t o  keep t h e  working c lass  in place. 
But t h e r e  were  also o ther  fac to rs  t h a t  weakened t h e  working c lass  i n  i t s  struggle 
a g a i n s t  t h e  e m p l o y e r s  (P iven  a n  c loward  underemphasize t h e  significance of these  
factors) .  Radical  segments  of t h e  working class a t t e m p t e d  t o  mobi l ize  t h e  work ing  
c l a s s  t h r o u g h  t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  t h e  N a t i o n a l  L a b o r  Union (with about 
200,000 t o  400,000 m e m b e r s  i n  1870),  t h e  K n o g h t s  of L a b o r  !(with s o m e  700,000 
members in 1886 just prior t h e  Haymarket which led t o  i t s  dissolution) and l a t e r  t h e  
Industrial Workers World. But t h e y  could not  succeed. A high level of consolidation 
did  n o t  o c c u r . . '  T h e r e  v a r i o u s  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  f a i lu re . .  . Worker s o l i d a r i t y  was 
undermined by t h e  enfranchisement of all whi te  m a l e  in t h e  ear ly  nineteenth  century; 
t h e  a r r i v a l  of immigrant labor willing t o  work fo r  reduced wages; t h e  possibility of 
upward mobility; t h e  disunity between skilled and unskilled workers as well a s  e thnic  
a n d  r a c i a l  divisions. .  . In  t h e  f a c e  of t h e s e  d iv i s ive  i n f l u e n c e s m  m i l i t a n t  l a b o r  
organizations were  unsuccessful in enlisting mass class support. For example,  a t  t h e  
h e i g h t  of l a b o r  i n f l u e n c e  i n  Chicago in t h e  wake of the  famous Pullman s t r ike  of 
1894, t h e  Labor-Populists won only about  20 percent  of t h e  potential  vo te  (40,000 ou t  
of 230,000).. ' Moreover, the  success  of labor was res t r ic ted t o  specific regions rather 
than t h e  whole country c(hJike Davis, NLR 123, .1980).. : 
Thus  t h e  A m e r i c a n  u p p e r  c l a s s  c o n t i n u e d  its d o m i n a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  twent ie th  
century compet ing successful ly  i n  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t s  w h i l e  r e s i s t i n g  r e g u l a t i o n  and  
g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  a t  home..  With t h e  wide-spread suffering caused by t h e  
depress ion ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  s s t a t e - b u s i n e s s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  c h a n g e d  s o m e w h a t .  T h e  
d e p r e s s i o n  caused economic hardship for  major segments  of t h e  American population 
and generated conflicts  among various social groups leading t o  e l e c t o r a l  c h a n g e  a n d  
major social reforms.. : 
Perhaps t h e  single most  tel l ing impact  was in t h e  realm of unemployment; which 
rose  from about  1.6 million in .I929 t o  4.3' in 1930, and 8 million in 1931. By 1933 
s o m e  12 .8  mi l l ion ,  o r  a q u a r t e r  of t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e ,  was  w i t h o u t  e m p l o y m e n t  
(Heilbroner a n d  S i n g e r ,  1984,  278). T w o  o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n s e q u e n c e s  of t h e  
depression w e r e  rising bankruptcies especially among t h e  small  business and subsequent 
wage c u t s  in i t ia ted by industries. Eighty f ive  thousand businesses failed. T o  remain 
c o m p e t i t i v e  o r  m a k e  up f o r  profi t  losses, many o ther  f i rms  began reducing wages..' 
"In Pennsylvania workers were  paid 5 cen t s  an hour in sawmills; 7 c e n t s  in g e n e r a l  
c o n t r a c t i n g . .  In O h i o  t h e  earnings of office workers were  c u t  by a third, those of 
s t o r e  clerks by nearly half" {(Heilbroner and Singer, 278).. . 
Also among those  adversely a f fac ted  were  t h e  American farmenrs. . '  While people 
went  without food, crops r o t t e d  in  t h e  f i e l d s  i n  m a n y  a r e a s .  " W e s t e r n  r a n c h e r s ,  
unable e i ther  t o  marke t  the i r  sheep o r  feed them,  s l i t  the i r  th roa t s  and hurled thei r  
carcasses  in to  canyons".. . Cot ton  a s  much as 1 3  million bales in 1932, c o u l d  n o t  b e  
s o l d  f o r  e n o u g h  p r o f i t  t o  pay for t h e  picking.. . While fa rm income dropped, taxes 
and mortgage obligations remained constant; as a result ,  t h o u s a n d s  of f a r m e r s  l o s t  
the i r  land.. . In a single day in April 1932, one-fourth of the  e n t i r e  a r e a  of the  t h e  
state of Mississippi went  t o  auction,  leading t h e  governor Bilbo t o  declare  t h a t  even 
he was turing pink (William E. Leuchtenburg, 1963, 22-25).. ' 
Percieving t h e  social order  in an  individualistic manner,  most of those  who were  
s u f f e r i n g ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  unemployed workers init ial ly f e l t  guilty and  ashamed about  
thei r  predicament.  A s  ind iv idua l s  t h e y  k e p t  c o n t e m p l a t i n g  a b o u t  w h a t  t h e y  d id  
w r o n g .  ... T h u s  t h e y  f a i l e d  t o  d e m a n d  re l i f . . :  B u t  a s  t h e i r  s a v i n g s  r a n  o u t  a n d  
unemployment mounted and t h e r  was some official accep tance  of t h e  social nature  of 
t h e  p r o b l e m ,  t h e  unemployed began changing the i r  views.. ' Many of t h e  unemployed 
c a m e  t o  believe t h a t  if t h e r e  were  no jobs, t h e n  a t  l e a s t  t h e y  had a r i g h t  t o  a n  
i n c o m e  t h a t  would e n a b l e  them and the i r  famil ies  t o  survive;; : This realization led 
many workers t o  s top  blaming themselves and in i t i a te  collective action., : 
Early on food r io ts  were  a common for  of popular protest.. ' With t h e  appearance 
of organizers, especially t h e  communists, political demonstrations were  organied in a 
n u m b e r  of m a j o r  cities.: M o s t  of t h e  poor  d i r e c t e d  t h e i r  p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  
inadequate  relief system in e f f e c t  and ca red  l i t t l e  about  who was actually doing t h e  
o r g a n i z i n g . . ;  A l t h o u g h  s o m e  i m p r o v e m e n t s  w e r e  m a d e  i n  t h e  r e l i e f  system, t h e  
arrangement  was  s t i l l  inadequate and kept breaking down ~(Piven and C l o w a r d ,  1977, 
56-60).; : 
F a r m e r s 1  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s ,  t h e  s t r u g g l e s  of t h e  unemployed, wage cu t s  and 
business fai lures eventually culminated in t h e  Democra t i c  victory i n  ~ o v e m b e r  1 9 3 2  
by a large  margin., . Franklin D. Roosevelt  swept  t o  victory with 22,880,000 votes  t o  
Hoover's 15,750,000. Roosvelt carried more  count ies  than  any presidential c a n d i d a t e  
h a d  e v e r  won  b e f o r e ,  inc lud ing  282 t h a t  h a d  n e v e r  g o n e  d e m o c r a t i c . . '  With t h e  
except ion of 1912, when t h e  party was divided, n o  R e p u b l i c a n  c a n d i d a t e  had e v e r  
been defea ted  s o  badly (William Leuchtenburg, 17).. ' The unemployed workers pressures 
was so g r e a t  t h a t  of ten congressmen a n d  s e n a t o r s  who  a d v o c a t e d  a d e q u a t e  re l i e f  
appropriations were  elected.. . 
By inauguration day economic conditions were  cri t ical .  ... The national income t h a t  
had declined dramatically f rom $380 billion in 1929 t o  $50 billion in 1932 was fu r the r  
declining, every bank had closed i t s  doors and unemployment was rising becaus half of 
a l l  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  u n i t s  had closed down., In response, President Roosevelt  passed 
t h e  New Deal legislation at t h e  end of t h e  f i r s t  "Hundred Days" in June  1933. FDR's 
N a t i o n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  R e c o v e r y  A c t  was  t o  p r o m o t e  e c o n o m i c  r e c o v e r y  t h r o u g h  
cooperation between business and government. Business was t o  be encouraged through 
m e a s u r e s  s u c h  as f i x e d  prices t o  insure fa i r  compet i t t ion and stabil ized production.. 
T o  ensure  t h e  political support of labor, t h e  NIRA g a v e  t h e  w o r k e r s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
o r g a n i z e  a n d  b a r g a i n  co l l ec t ive ly . .  . F a r m e r s  were  appeased by cheap  credit ,  price 
supports, l imited production and government purchase of surplus crops. ' Most  u r g e n t  
was a program of emergency relief for  t h e  unemployed; between May 1933, and June, 
1936, t h e  Federal  government spen t  $3 billion on relief alone.. * 
T h i s  s i g n a l e d  a m a j o r  sh i f t  in government policy.. . Although a f t e r  World War 1 
business  h a d  i n i t i a t e d  s o m e  m e a s u r e  of s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  t h r o u g h  i t s  o w n  t r a d e  
assoc ia t ions - -R  o o s e v e l t  h imse l f  had  b e c o m e  i n  1922  p r e s i d e n t  of o n e  of t h e s e  
a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  t h e  A m e r i c a n  C o n s t r u c t i o n  Counc i l - - ,  i t  h a d  n o t  i n v i t e d  s t a t e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n . .  ' By 1931,  s o m e  bus iness  l e a d e r s ,  especia l ly  Henry Harriman of the  
Chamber  of Commerce  and Gerard Swope of G e n e r a l  E l e c t r i c ,  a l o n g  w i t h  l e a d e r s  
f rom oil industry were  calling for  national economic planning. .. In unstable industries 
l ike  coa l  a n d  t h e  g a r m e n t ,  t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  p l a n n i n g  c a m e  f r o m  s p o k e s m e n  f o r  
I 
organized labbr such a s  John Lewis, from t h e  United Mine Workers.. . Workers in some 
very compet i t ive  industries were  experiencing much hardship and thus i t  m a d e  s e n s e  
t o  have some kind of regulations in the i r  pa r t  (Arthur M. Schlesinger, 1959, 88-89).. . 
A l t h o u g h  d e s i g n e d  t o  d i r e c t  t h e  na t ion ' s  e c o n o m i c  r e c o v e r y ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
i n d u s t r i a l  R e c o v e r y  A c t  i t s e l f  exasperated s o m e  of t h e  exist ing conf l ic ts  and even 
genera ted  new ones. Encouraged by t h e  S e c t i o n  7 (a )  of t h e  NIRA, t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  
working c lass  began organizing for  unionization and  collective bargaining.. . For about 
a century American workers had t h e  right t o  organize in; but had been f rus t ra ted by 
employers' rejection of union organization.. ; With t h e  NIRA t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  
g a v e  i t s  o f f i c i a l  a p p r o v a l  of un ion iza t ion . . '  o n c e  a g a i n  m i l i t a n t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
communists, played a k e y  r o l e  i n  t h e  u n i o n i z a t i o n  s t r u g g l e s .  In r e s p o n s e  m a n y  
i n d u s t r i a l  f i r m s  s o u g h t  t o  c a p i t a l i z e  on  ambigui ty  of t h e  law and began organize 
company unions. Employers  i n t e r p r e t e d  t h e  l a w  in  a s e l f - s e r v i n g  m a n n e r .  N o t  
surprisingly labor resisted t h e  imposition of company unions, engaging in  major. s t r ikes  
against  a number of large  industrial  firms. Three  t imes  as many w o r k e r s  s t r u c k  i n  
1 9 3 3  a f t e r  t h e  p a s s a g e  of NIRA as i n  1932.. . Many of t h e  s t r ikes  culminated in 
violent confrontations between workers  a n d  e m p l o y e r s .  But  t h i s  t i m e ,  e m p l o y e r s  
u n a b l e  t o  r e s o r t  t o  p rev ious  t ac t i cs  such a s  cour t  injunctions, or repression by t h e  
Pinkertons and t h e  s tate m i l i t i a s .  A l t h o u g h  i n '  a m a t t e r  of m o n t h s  R o o s e v e l t ' s  
s u p p o r t  f o r  l a b o r  w a s  t o  d e c l i n e ,  t h e  working c lass  gained t h e  right t o  collective 
bargaining through t h e  Wagner A c t  in July 1 9 3 5  ( t h e  Wagner  A c t  a l s o  e s t a b l i s h e d  
minimum wage, maximum working hours, and abolished child labor).. . This significant 
victory was achieved through a combination of f a c t o r s  s u c h  a s  i n d u s t r i a l  workers '  
s tr ikes,  Senator Wagner's e f fo r t s  in t h e  Congress, and some middle c lass  support for  
labor. . 
D e s p i t e  t h e  labor victory o ther  segments  of t h e  NIRA was eliminated.. J u s t  as 
labor confronted t h e  industrialists a f t e r  t h e  passage of NIRA in  1933, s e g m e n t s  of 
business began a t tacking t h e  government.. . T o  implement  t h e  Ti t le  1 of t h e  NIRA, t h e  
regulation of industrial  economy, General  Hugh J o h n s o n ,  a p p o i n t e d  a s  t h e  h e a d  of 
NRA,  moved  t o  develop codes fo r  f a i r  competi t ion in industries.. ' Part ly  because of 
lack of administrat ive personnel, h e  recrui ted m o s t  of his o f f i c i a l s  f r o m  t h e  v e r y  
i n d u s t r i e s  t o  b e  regulated.. . Major corporations were  thus ab le  t o  use the i r  political 
position t o  thei r  economic advantage.  Thus they  stabil ized product ion,  a n d  g r a n t e d  
monopoly prices t o  the i r  own firms.. This process of course adversely a f f e c t e d  those  
industries t h a t  had been l e f t  o u t  of government-business "cooperation". Eventually, as 

turned t h e  s t a t e  in to  a t a r g e t  of a t tack.  T h e  result  was t h e  reduction of government 
intervention i n  t h e  economy and  t h e  aff imat ion of market  mechanism.. ' 
T o  fur the r  depoli'ticize t h e  economy, t h e  capi ta l is t  class steadily pursued policies 
designed t o  weaken t h e  capaci ty  of the  working c lass  in collective bargaining .... With 
t h e ' l e f t w a r d  shi f t  of a segment  of t h e  CIO a f t e r  1935, m i d d l e  c l a s s  s y m p a t h y  f o r  
labor waned; by l a t e  1937 labor s t r ikes  had been put down by New Deal governors in  
a number of states with no opposition f rom Roosevelt  i(Mike Davis, NLR, 124, -19801.. : 
A m e r i c a n  l a b o r  w a s  w e a k e n e d  f u r t h e r  by s u b s e q u e n t  e v e n t s  such a s  t h e  division 
between CIO and AFL, a n d  t h e  S e c o n d  World War. A m o n g  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  w a s  t h e  i m p a c t  upon l a b o r  by t h e  passage of Taft-Hartley Act  which 
c a m e  w i t h ' t h e  Cold War. S o m e  saw t h i s  a s  a d i r e c t  c o r p o r a t e  a t t a c k  on  labor . .  : 
Representa t ive  Donald L. OIToole of New York put i t  " the  Bill was wri t ten  sen tence  
by sentence,  paragraph by paragraph, page by page by t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  of 
M a n u f a c t u r e t s  (quoted in Boyer and Morais, 1955, 347).&. The Taft-Hartley Act  gave 
cour ts  t h e  power t o  f ine  for  alleged violations and  established a sixty-day cooling off 
p e r i o d  d u r i n g  which  s t r i k e s  could no t  be declared.. : I t  outlawed mass  picketing and  
s e c o n d a r y  b o y c o t t s .  P e r h a p s  m o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  i t  o u t l a w e d  t h e  e l e c t i o n  of 
communists as union officials.. : The l a s t  measure  led t h e  CIO t o  expel1 eleven of i t s  
unions in -1949, fu r the r  weakening t h e  union. T h e  expulsion made poss ible  t h e  1 9 5 5  
m e r g e r  of t h e  AFL and CIO. In succeeding years, labor organizations have l imited 
themselves t o  primarily economic issues.. . 
H a d  g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e r v e n e d  d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  of capital  allocation and  
accumulation,  t h e  politicization of t h e  economy would have increased labor militancy 
r e s u l t i n g  in g rea te r  resistance against  the  assul t  and t h e  consequent depoliticization.. 
Had t h e  NRA continued i t s  existence,  t h e  s t a t e  would have been seen as an ally of 
t h e  big industry and l iable t o  a t t a c k  (indeed shor t ly  before  t h e  end of t h e  NRA some 
labor leaders, such a s  John Lewis, began m a k i n g  s u c h  c h a r g e s ;  b u t  w h e n  t h e  d a y  
c a m e  t o  t a k e  a s tand  for  or against, t h e y  s tood f o r  t h e  NRA). However, with t h e  
e n d  of NRA in  1935, s t a t e  intervention in  pr ivate  industry decreased,  leading t o  a 
reemergence of t h e  marke t  mechanism in t h e  U.S.. economy.. ' 
Today although t h e  share  of .government spending has increased f rom 10 percent 
in 1940 t o  22.6 in '.1980, t h e  state does not  d i rect ly  in te rvene  i n  c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  
a n d  a c c u m u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  U.S. I t  has no industrial  investment of its own, nor any 
joint ventures  with private indust ry .  S i g n i f i c a n t  e c o n o m i c  i s s u e s  a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  
through t h e  market ,  private corporations and depoliticized labor unions.:, Although t h e  
state occasionally intervenes directly in t h e  affa i rs  of part icular f i r m s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  
C h r y s l e r  b a i l o u t ,  t h i s  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a low l e v e l  of ac t iv i t iy  in i t ia ted primarily fo r  
defensive purposes.. . 
That  recen t  massive layoffs  have n o t  politicized t h e  american working c lass  from 
I politicizing t h e  massive layoffs in i t ia ted by t h e  American employers can be seen as  a 
par t  of the  general  depoliticization of economic issues.. : In general, American workers 
t e n d  t o  blame themselves fo r  the i r  social situation, feeling shame and guilt fo r  what 
t h e y  p e r c i e v e  a s  underachievement (Sennet and Cobb, 1972).i : Such a perspective on 
l i f e  has important  social and political consequences, as i l lustrated an  in teres t ing study 
of t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t  w e e n  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  m e n t a l  illness.:.: A c c o r d i n g  t o  
congressional testimony, a ' 1 percen t  increase  in t h e  unemployment r a t e  sustained over 
6 years  was associated with 20,240 cardiovascular deaths, 920 suicides, 643 homicide, 
and 4,227 s t a t e  mental  hospital admissions ~ ( H a r v e y  Brenner, October 1976).. ' 
I n  s u m ,  in  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  i m p o r t a n t  social problems have relat ively l i t t l e  
impac t  on politics due  t o  a low level of p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c  i n t e g r a t i o n  a n d  a low 
l e v e l  of consol idat ion. .  Unemployment i s  inarguably a social problem (pre-capitalist 
socie t ies  did not  have this problem and i t  would be a contradiction in t e r m s  t o  say 
t h a t  s l a v e s  o r  s e r f s  w e r e  unemployed) ;  i t  i s  t h e  r e s u l t  of market operation and 
the re fore  difficult t o  blame. T h e  result  i s  political iriaction. During those  t imes of 
a high level of consolidation, t h e  s t a t e  tends  t o  in t roduce l imi ted reforms t o  rel ieve 
t h e  s i t u a t i o n . . :  T o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  s o c i a l  p r o b l e m s  a r e  a d d r e s s e d ,  t h e  s t a t e  i s  
percieved as supporter of t h e  v i c t i m s ,  t h e r e b y  e s c a p i n g  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  a t t a c k  a n d  
challenge.. . 
Russia 
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  a n  n u m b e r  of d e v e l o p i n g  s o c i e t i e s  h a v e  
experienced mass ive  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  upheava l s ,  beg in ing  w i t h  t h a t  of R u s s i a .  An 
examination of t h e  social  format ion of the  Russian experience a f t e r  t h e  1861 reform 
is  an  ins t ruct ive  example  of t h e  interaction between pol i t ica l -economic i n t e g r a t i o n ,  
and solidarity s t ructures ,  leading t o  a revolutionary outcome.. ' 
From a c o m p a r a t i v e  h i s t o r i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t h e  R u s s i a n  l a n d e d  u p p e r  c l a s s ,  
although dominant upon o ther  classes, never achieved t h e  level of immunity, autonomy 
and economic s t reng th  of i t s  Western counterparts .  In addit ion t o  strengthening t h e  
Imperial s t a te ,  the  abolition of serfdom in 1861 fur ther  undercut t h e  position of t h e  
landed upper class already indebted t o  t h e  government..:  With such a weak base, this  
c l a s s  was  n o t  i n  a pos i t ion  t o  industrialize t h e  country and consequently remained 
subordinate t o  t h e  state. .  : 
As a response t o  t h e  humiliation of de fea t s  in  t h e  Crimean War (1853-55 with 
England and France), toward t h e  end of t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  t h e  I m p e r i a l  s t a t e  
init iated a ser ies  of economic measures intended t o  industrialize Russia rapidly ...' But 
t h e  government had t o  depend on Europe fo r  th is  development. T o  rec ieve  Western 
help, t h e  government needed a large and visible surplus for  t r a d e  t o  enable  i t  repay 
t h e  foriegn loans and in te res t  charges  ~ ( A l e c  Nove, 1969, 18). T o  obtain foriegn loans, 
Russia was dependent on t h e  expor t  of grain.. . From 1890 until 1911, grain accounted 
fo r  46-52 percent of a l l  Russian annual exports (G.B. Carson, 1959, 120-1) ... 
I D e p e n d e n c e  on s i z e a b l e  g r a i n  expor t  resulted in l i t t l e  benef i t  fo r  landlords or 
cultivators. O n ' t h e  whole, a g r a r i a n  i n t e r e s t s  f a v o r e d  f r e e  t r a d e  o r  low c u s t o m  
d u t i e s ,  t o  a v o i d  increases  i n  prices of imported manufactured goods.. ' S u c h  a policy 
a l o n g  w i t h  s o m e  i m p r o v e m e n t s  in  c u l t i v a t i n g  t e c h n i q u e  would h a v e  i n c r e a s e d  
production., : Improvements of t h e  agricultural  sec to r  would have in tu rn  widened t h e  
e x t e n t  of t h e  m a r k e t  f o r  t h e  industrial sector.  But state policy (initiated by Witte 
a f t e r  1890)  r e j e c t d  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e . ,  Instead t h e  state pursued policies t o  res t r ic t  
peasant consumption. In addit ion t o  redemption payments, peasants paid between 10 
t o  40 t i m e s  m o r e  t a x e s  t h a n  e s t a t e o w n e r s .  - t h e  s t a t e  p u t  a h e a v y  t a x  on t h e  
peasantry.. Whereas landlords paid between 2 t o  1 0  percent  of t h e i r  i n c o m e  t o  t h e  
s t a t e ,  p e a s a n t s  w e r e  assessed a t  more  than 50 percent..  ' Of t h e  208 million rubles 
levid in 1872, peasants paid 195 million rubles and landlords a mere  1 3  million. By 
t h e  e n d  of t h e  cen tury ,  the  peasant share  increased even fu r the r  (Peter  Lyashenko, 
1949, 446-7). T h e  state also imposed a heavy e x c i s e  t a x  on a l c h o h o l i c  b e v e r a g e s  
( g ~ v e r n m e n t  monopoly) highly consumed by t h e  low income rural population, the  great  
major i ty  of whom were  alcholic. The  s t a t e  also t axed  t h e  peasants with t h e  sa le  of 
kerosene, matches,  sugar and tobacco.. . 
L a c k  of  i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  a l o n g  w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n  g r o w t h  a n d  
increasingly heavy ex t rac t ion  of agrarian surplus l e d  t o  a d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of p e a s a n t  
life., Per cap i ta  ou tpu t  declined a f t e r  t h e  1890's (Gerchenkron, 1960, 481.. Per  capi ta  
I - 
I grain consumption fe l l  by about 20 percent b e t w e e n  1 8 8 3  a n d  . I914  (Carson ,  1959, 
121).. ' With population increases, the  s ize  of t h e  average  peasant holding shrunk from 
13.2- desyatinas (one desyatina is  2.7 acres), in  1877 t o  1.4' in 1905. T h e  number of 
c a t t l e  a l s o  decl ined from 37.2 per hundred persons in  1880 t o  30 in 1909. Peasant 
n u t r i t i o n ,  a l r e a d y  e s t i m a t e d  t o  b e  d e f i c i e n t  by 3 0  p e r c e n t  e v e n  u n d e r  n o r m a l  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  as a r e p o r t  t o  P r e m i e r  C o u n t  W i t t e  n o t e d ,  worsened with harsh - 
government policies ci(Chamberlain, .1935, 14-15). Despite a rise in  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  of 
f a m i n e s  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p o r t  po l i c ies  paid  l i t t l e  heed t o  t h e  plight of t h e  starving 
T h e  d e c l i n i n g  s t a n d a r d  of I lv ing of t h e  p e a s a n t r y  pa id  f o r  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
d e v e l o p m e n t  as t h e  e x t r a c t e d  agriculutral  surplus subsidized industrial development. 
T h e  state had t o  propel industrialization since under a low level of l iv ing  v o l u n t a r y  
s a v i n g  would  n o t  h a v e  been likely ... Increased expor t  revenues allowed t h e  s t a t e  t o  
expand i t s  encouragement of industry, railway construction,  telegraph c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
and c red i t  inst i tutions (s ta te  Bank, Peasant  Bank, t h e  Noblemen's bank) ...  The Russian 
' s t a t e  owned vas t  t r a c t s  of land encompassing 60 percent  of all fo res t s  in t h e  country.. ; 
In  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  s t a t e  a l s o  possesed  v a l u a b l e  m i n e s  i n  t h e  Altai, t h e  Urals, and 
Siberia, processing thei r  o re  at state-owned plants ((Lyashchenko, 1949, 554). Railways 
a n d  a l c h o h o l i c  b e v e r a g e s  w e r e  a l s o  g o v e r n m e n t  m o n o p o l i e s  which yie lded large  
reven'ues f o r  t h e  'state., : 
With expanded economic activit ies,  t h e  state was ab le  t o  assist  t h e  pr ivate  sector  
t o w a r d  r a p i d  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .  In  t h e  1870's  a n d  1 8 8 0 1 s ,  R u s s i a n  i n d u s t r i a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  r e q u e s t e d  a n d  w e r e  g r a n t e d  p r o t e c t i v e  t a r i f f s . . -  By t h e  end of t h e  
century,  t a r i f f s  f o r  several  heavy industries had risen so  much t h a t  c e r t a i n  i m p o r t s  
had practically become prohibitive ... : Additional programs ini t ia ted by Count Witte in  
1890's w e r e  ins t rumental .  in Russian economic development until1 '.1914. For  example, 
t h e  government  con t rac ted  railroad and  por t  construction t o  Russian industries t o  t h e  
exclusion of foreign firms. As a result ,  Russian business enjoyed a monopoly of large  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  p r o j e c t s  a n d  w e r e  able t o  charge correspondingly high prices for  the i r  
' 
services. Finally in an  a t t e m p t  t o  m a i n t a i n  a f a v o r a b l e  t r a d e  b a l a n c e  t h e  s t a t e '  
s h i f t e d  i t s  p a p e r  c u r r e n c y  t o  go ld  t o  i n s u r e  R u s s i a n  a n d  f o r i e g n  f i r m s  of t h e  
soundness of t h e  Russian currency.. . 
S t a t e  e f f o r t s  paid off and Russia experienced rapid development., . Between 18901 
and 1900 Russian industry grew at an  averag  8 p e r c e n t  pe r  y e a r ,  w h i l e  i n d u s t r i a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  m o r e  t h a n  doubled.. . T h e  value of production amounted t o  26.1 million 
rubles a year of added industrial production during 1878-1887; i t  rose t o  41.6 million 
during 1888 and 1892, and 161,2 milLion rubles dur ing  1893-1897 (Lyashenko ,  1949, 
526-27) ... In 1900, Russia's oil production was t h e  highest in t h e  world (Nove, 1969, 
13). S t a t e  policies also generated a n  impressive number of industrial enterprises.  In 
1 8 8 1  t h e r e  w e r e  21,173 firms, a m e r e  f ive  l a te r ,  thei r  number had risen t o  38,401 
(chamberlain, 1935, 15). , 
D e a p i t e  r a p i d  i n d u s t r i a l  g r o w t h ,  t h e  deve lopment  was uneven a f fec t ing  social 
groups and classes differently.. ; Government policies encouraged heavy industries such 
as i r o n ,  s t e e l ,  p e t r o l e u m  a n d  m a c h i n a r y  indus t ry . .  . Within these  sec to rs  a small  
number of f i rms utilizing more  sophist icated machinery accounted for  a m a j o r  s h a r e  
of t h e  output.. ' In t h e  petroleum industry, for example,' less than 10 percent  of t h e  
f i r m s  produced 69 percent of al l  petroleum products. In 1898, 4 percent of al l  coal 
mines accounted f o r  43 percent of t h e  to ta l  coa l .ou tpu t  !(lyashehnko, 5311.. . Crucial t o  
t h e  industrial  development of Russia, w e r e  rai lroads constructed by a dozen "favorite" 
p l a n t s  o w n e d .  p r i m a r i l y  by p e r s o n s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  upper  c i rc les . . :  By s u p p o r t i n g  
monopolistic practices,  t h e  s t a t e  virtually subsidized and supported this g iant  industry.. 
E v e n  m o d e s t  e s t i m a t e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  o v e r p a y m e n t  c o s t  t h e  national treasury 15 
million rubles a year (Lyaashchenko, 560).. 
Such policies enriched not  only Russian industrial ists  but the i r  foreign associates 
as well, f o r  fully one third of t h e  invested capi ta l  in Russia in t h e  l a t e  n i n e t e e n t h  
century was supplied by foreign f i rms  (Nove, 18).. : Civil servants connected with large 
enterpr ises  reaped profi ts  from s t a t e - i m p o s e d  c o n t r o l s ,  r e g u l a t i o n ,  l i c e n s i n g  a n d  
c a p i t a l  a l locat ion. .  . In contras t ,  small  f i rms producing consumer goods w e r e  ignored.. 
They  did not recieve any of t h e  preferential  t r e a t m e n t s  extended t o  large  enterprises.. 
T h i s  f o l l o w e d  direct ly  from t h e  government s t r a t e g y  avoiding t o  pursue development 
of l ight  industries based upon mass-market demand.. . 
M o r e  s e r i o u s  was  t h e  e c o n o m i c  p l igh t  of n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  a n d  t h e  urban 
working class. Since Russian indus t r i a l i za t ion  w a s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  in  r e l a t i v e l y  f e w  
reg ions  of t h e  count ry ,  na t ional  minor i t ies  r e c e i v e d  l i t t l e  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e  economic  
deve lopmen t . . "  C o n s e q u e n t l y  regional  d ispar i t ies  widened dur ing  t h e  per iod  of heavy 
industr ial izat ion.  T h e  indus t r ia l  working c lass  a l so  l abo red  under a d v e r s e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
.work ing  f r o m  1 2  t o  1 7  h o u r s  a d a y  ... : T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  p r e v e n t e d  e f f e c t i v e  labor  
organizat ions.  Thus  wages  r e m a i n e d  low in  general. . :  Workers  i n  l ight  indus t r ies  such  
as t e x t i l e  w e r e  p a i d  e x t r e m e l y  l o w  w a g e s ,  p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  l ight  indus t ry  did n o t  
r e c i e v e  any  gove rnmen t  subsidies.. . employees  i n  heavy heavy i n d u s t r i e s  f a r e d  l i t t l e  
bet ter . .  : Oil workers  i n  Baku worked 1 6  t o  17 hours dai ly f o r  low wages  ( ~ y a s h c h e n k o ,  
545.-49).:. . 
T o w a r d  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  cen tu ry ,  in  response  t o  worker pressure,  t h e  
gove rnmen t  promulgated  s o m e  leg is la t ion  t o  modify  t h e  s i tuat ion.  N e w  l a w s  r egu la t ed  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  h i r i n g ,  p reven ted  child labor  a n d  ou t l awed  paymen t  i n  kind. ... In 1896, 
leg is la t ion  w a s  e n a c t e d  l imi t ing  t h e  workday t o  11  hours, and  establ ishing Sunday and 
h o l i d a y s  as d a y s  of r e s t  f o r  a l l  workers.; * However,  th is  leg is la t ion  appl ied  only  t o  
en te rp r i se s  t h a t  employed m o r e  t h a n  20 workers ,  a n d  e v e n  t h e n  w e r e  r a r e l y  enforced..  ' 
A l t h o u g h  t h e  g o v e r m e n t  m o d i f i e d  s o m e  of  t h e  l a b o r  l a w s  r e g a r d i n g  i n d u s t r i a l  
acc iden t s ,  t h e  s i t ua t ion  of i n d u s t r i a l  w o r k e r s  r e m a i n e d  l a r g e l y  t h e  s a m e  ( ( M a n y a  
Cordon,  1941, 25-29)..' In sum,  t h e  Russian working  c l a s s  at t h e  t u r n  of t h e  c e n t u r y  
w a s  bo th  highly exp lo i t ed  and  defenseless..  ; 
With  t h e  dep res s ion  of  1900, economic  g rwo th  s lowed a n d  t h e  plight of workers  
g r e w  m o r e  despara te .  T h e  d e e p e n i n g  e c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  l e f t  t h e  w o r k i n g  c l a s s  n o  
a l t e r n a t i v e  but  rebellion.. . St r ikes  s p r e a d  rapid ly  a n d  a s sumed  poli t ical  ~ h a r a c t e r . ~  : In 
t h e  s u m m e r  of -1903 t h e  baku o i l  w o r k e r s '  s t r i k e  w a s  q u i c k l y  t a k e n  u p  i n  T i f l i s ,  
B a t u m  a n d  o t h e r  C a u c a s i a n  towns.. : O t h e r  worke r s  walked o u t  i n  Odessa,  Kiev a n d  
e l s e w h e r e  i n  Russian.. . 
S t r i k e s  a n d  r e b e l l i o n s  g r a d u a l l y  w i d e n e d  assuming nation-wide proport ions by 
1905. Throughout  t h a t  yea r  t h e r e  w e r e  cont inual  work  stoppages;  t h e  t o t a l  number  of 
s t r ikers  reaced 2,865,145, an enormous number given t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  number 
of Russ ian  i n d u s t r i a l  w o r k e r s  was less than t w o  million.. ' Of course  many workers 
part icipated in  several  strikes. Roughly two-thirds of t h e  s t r ikes  were  political fo r  
they  w e r e  di rected agains t  t h e  s t a t e  and i t s  capi ta l is t  allies, t h e  large  firms.. - During 
th is  period numerous workers Soviets were  fo-und. 
~ u r a l  a r e a s  a l s o  s h o w e d  s i g n s  o f  r e b e l l i o n s  i n  e a r l y  19001s..: Poverty-striken 
peasants in some dis t r ic ts  raided and a t t acked  t h e  estates of landowners in. t h e  spring 
of 1902 (Chamberlain, 1935, 46).:. Peasnat rebellions also assumed a larger  charac te r  
in 1905. Early .1905, agricultural  workers s t ruck  and  e n g a g e d  i n  i l l e g a l  c u t t i n g  of 
t imber belonging t o  t h e  state and  landlords.:; In August of t h a t  year, a gathering of 
peasant delegates, along with a f e w  representa t ives  f rom revolut ionary p a r t i e s ,  m e t  
n e a r  Moscow t o  d e c l a r e  i t s e l f  " t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  A s s e m b l y  of t h e  All-Russian 





rebellion had spread throughout t h e  countryside (Chamberlain, 1935, 49-55).. ' 
I However lack of a c learcut  program, leadership a n d  c o o r d i n a t i o n  of c o l l e c t i v e  
act ion fa ta l ly  weakened t h e  movement.. ' Most of t h e  peasant rebellions were  sporadic 
I 
and unorganized. Although workers in ci t ies were  b e t t e r  organized, thei r  coordination 
1 was inadequate.. The res is tance of about 2000 a r m e d  workers collapsed in Moscow in  
I 
I t h e  f a c e  of joint a t t a c k  by t h e  Moscow garrison ((manned by lots of rel-uctant soldiers) 
a n d  a d d i t i o n a l  reinforcement f rom St.. Petersburg ... While t h e  urban poor backed t h e  
revolutionaries, they  were  forced t o  act in  small  groups t o  avoid t h e  a r m y  fire.  This 
weakenes the  solidarity.. 1 Furthermore,  military te inf  orcements  would no t  have arrived 
at all has workers in  St. Petersburg struck, paralying t h e  railroads as t h e y  had done 
e a r l i e r  i n  O c t o b e r .  ..' F i n a l l y  as C o u n t  W i t t e  h a d  c a l c u l a t e d ,  t h e  g r a n t i n g  of a 
constitution and promise of civil l i b e r t i e s  i n  O c t o b e r  1905,  s p l i t  t h e  l i b e r a l s  a n d  
s o c i a l i s t  forces . : '  This el iminated t h e  likelihood of consolidation leading t o  t h e  final  
de fea t  of all forces.  By mid J u n e  ,1907, t h e  Second Duma had been dissolved by t h e  
Tsar  along with whatever  l ibert ies t h e  liberals had gained earl ier .  
In t h e  nex t  f ew years, t h e  Russian s t a t e  was forced t o  reduce t h e  scope of i t s  
economic developinent policies. T h e  Russo-Japanese war and t h e  i n t e r n a l  p r o b l e m s  
s e v e r e l y  r e d u c e d  s tate r e s o u r c e s ,  f o r c i n g  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  t o  rely on i t s  own 
resources on an  i n c r e a s i n g  s c a l e .  H o w e v e r ,  i n d u s t r i a l  a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t  po l ic ies  
r e m a i n e d  unchanged because banks and financial institutionas, st i l l  dependent on t h e  
s t a t e ,  re ta ined t h e i r  p rev ious  e m p h a s i s  o n  l a r g e ,  h e a v y  a n d  m o d e r n  i n d u s t r y  as 
opposed t o  small, light tradit ional  manufactures '  (Gerschenkron, 1960, 57) ... During th is  
s a m e  period, t h e  industrial s t ruc tu res  c r e a t e d  by t h e  s tate w e r e  f u r t h e r  s o l i d i f i e d  
through industrial  concentration and format ion of monopolies. (Lyashchenko, 1949, 669) 
In t h e  a r e a  of agriculture, s t a t e  policies underwent some changes. R e c o g n i z i n g  
t h e  potential  danger of rural communes, t h e  government a t t e m p t e d  t o  break them up 
in  favor  of p r i v a t e  plots .  In N o v e m b e r  ' . l907,  a l a w  w a s  passed  w e a k e n i n g  t h e  
compulsory communal l i f e  of peasants by giving t h e m  t h e  right t o  demand thei r  sha re  
of land frorn t h e  consolidated holding. A second law of July, 1910 made possible t h e  
d i s s o l u t i o n  of a n y  c o m m u n e  by a m a j o r i t y  v o t e  of i t s  members. ' :  These reforms, 
in i t ia ted by Stolypin, had l i t t l e  success, as evidenced by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  only 22 percent  
of peasants living communally chose t o  leave t h e  commune. ..: Of these, relat ively few, 
a l ready  more  prosperous, b e n e f i t e d  f r o m  t h e  r e f o r m .  T h e  m a j o r i t y  of p e a s a n t s  . 
continued t o  live i n  thei r  tradit ional  communes.: : 
In sum, t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of Russian socie ty  changed l i t t l e  in t h e  years  following t h e  
1905 uprisings.. : The pat tern  of rapid economic development proceeded.. ' The  income 
of agr icul ture  increased by 88.6 percent  from 1900 t o  1913.. Grain expor ts  were  50 
p e r c e n t  h igher  during the  period 1911-13 than t h e y  were  from 1901-05.. : Exports of 
butter ,  flax, and other  agricultural  products also i n c r e a s e d  t(Nove, 23). P r o t e c t i v e  
t a r i f f s  encouraged g rea te r  cult ivation of co t ton  in  cen t ra l  Asia region, a policy which 
benef i ted  those  who used modern e q u i p m e n t ,  o n l y  a s m a l l  m i n o r i t y  of producers. .  
Industrial development was also impressive, a s  t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  of i n d u s t r i a l  o u t p u t  
i n c r e a s e d  72.9' p e r c e n t  f r o m  2,839.1 mi l l ion  r u b l e s  i n  1897 t o  4,908.7 i n  1908  
(L yashchenko, 1949, 670). 
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e  government continued t o  t a x  t h e  population through its 
monopoly of alcohol and railroads while borrowing money f rom i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o u r c e s  
t o  f i n a n c e  i n d u s t r i a l  d e v e l o p m e n t . .  ' As a resut  t h e  national debt grew from 6,392 
million rubles in 1901 t o  9,055 million r u b l e s  in  1909,  d e c r e a s i n g  on ly  s l i g h t l y  t o  
8 ,824 mil l ion r u b l e s  i n  191 3.'L : A t  t h a t  t i m e  Russia ranked second in t h e  world in 
absolute  size of its national debt.  "In amount of payments p e r  y e a r  o n  s e r v i c e  of 
t h e  debt,  however, Russia was first ;  in 1913 th is  ran t o  424,378,000 rubles" (Carson, 
131). The  cost  of all th is  was  paid by t h e  ex t rac t ion  of surplus from. t h e  peasantry 
a n d  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  working class,  while state managers and t h e  tiny industrial  upper 
class continued t o  benefit  f rom t h e  industrial growth.. . 
T h e  p a r t i c u l a r  state-sponsores develoment expanded t h e  Russian prole tar ia t  in a 
very concentra ted form. Due t o  foriegn investment  and emphasis on heavy industry, 
Russian f i rms  were  highly concentra ted in comparison with more  advanced economies,. : 
According. t o  Gordon "In t h e  concentration of production Russia as ear ly  as 1895 had 
s u r p a s s e d  Germany . .  ; In  t h a t  year t h e  wage e a r n e r s  in  Russian factor ies  with more  
than 500 employees consti tuted 42 percent of a l l  workers, whereas  in Germany these  
l a r g e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  only 15 percen t  of the  working population ..EYy 
1912 t h e  workers in Russian fac to r ies  with more  than 500 employees were  53 percent 
of t h e  whole. ,  ' A s  l a t e  a s  1 9 2 5  in Germany t h e  establishments with 1000 o r  more  
employees had 30 percent of al l  workers in  f a c t o r i e s  w i t h  m o r e  t h a n  f i f t y  hands.  ..' 
R u s s i a  as e a r l y  a s  1912 h a d  4 3  p e r c e n t  i n  f a c t o r i e s  employing 1000 persons and 
over....Even m o r e  s t r i k i n g  i s  t h e  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  Of  a l l  
employees in establishments wi th  more  than f i f t y  hands t h e  workers in enterprises of 
f ive  hundred hands o r  more  were  47 percent  in t h e  United S t a t e s  in t h e  year 1929.: 
They were  61 perce t  in Russia in 1912" ((Gordon, 354). This g rea t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of 
course  enhanced t h e  capaci ty  of t h e  Russian working class t o  act collectively .... 
Adversely a f fec ted  by t h e  several  decades of s t a te - sponsored  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  t h e  
R u s s i a n  w o r k i n g  c l a s s  h a d  b o t h  a c l e a r  t a r g e t  of a t t a c k  and  t h e  capaci ty  t o  act 
collectively. S t a t e  economic development policies had politicized a n d  pol a r i  z e d  t h e  
R u s s i a n  e c o n o m y  a n d  soc ie ty . .  . T h e  s t a t e  policies had subst i tu ted for  t h e  invisible 
hand of t h e  market ,  thus p o l i t i c i z i n g  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  e c o n o m i c  i s s u e s .  T h e  
narrow state all iance wi th  t h e  t iny industrial upper class had a negative impac t  upon 
t h e  res t  of t h e  Russian society,  thus polarizing t h e  population.. 
Following t h e  economic slowdown of 1907-9, workers re-intensified the i r  struggles 
in 1910. Official  d a t a  show a rise of workers' s t r ikes  during t h e  f ive  years  prior t o  
t h e  Firs t  World War.. . The s t r ikers  evinced considerable solidarity among themselves.. ' 
For  example,  in 1912, a wave of s t r ikes  broke o u t  across t h e  country t o  protest  t h e  
massacre of several  hundred workers in  Lena gold fields of Siberia.. Throughout 1913 
and 1914, thousands of s t r ikes  took place most of which were  political in character..  . 
i n  M a r c h  1914, jus t  f e w  m o n t h s  b e f o r e  t h e  war, the  industrial ists  recognized t h e  
dimensions of t h e  crisis declaring a huge lockout in  St. Petersburg t h a t  a f f e c t e d  some 
70,000 workers. .  ' T h i s  r e s u l t e d  i n  l a r g e - s c a l e  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . .  : Rura l  a reas  also 
experienced g rea t  tumoil  during th is  pe r iod .  B e t w e e n  1910-14, m o r e  t h a n  13,000 
disturbances broke ou t  among t h e  Russian peasantry (lyashchenko, 1949, 692-4).. ' 
Thus, i t  was under condition of politicization and polarization t h a t  Russia en te red  
t h e  European  conf l i c t . .  . T h e  War a g g r a v a t e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of the  working class, 
causing shortages and  rising inflation. Despite war t ime  restr ict ions,  s t r ikes  persisted 
t h r o u g h o u t  1915  a n d  1916  as f o o d  r i o t s  spread. .  . Eventually, as t h e  working class 
s t r ikes  assumed a national charac te r  and consolidated itself with t h e  p e a s a n t r y  in a 
large  bloc against  t h e  Tsarist  state, the  soldiers, suffering heavily from t h e  hardships 
and defea t s  of t h e  war and in sympathy with t h e  opposition, stopped fighting f o r  t h e  
Tsar  and  joined t h e  rebellious workers beginning in Petrograd.  In  M a r c h  1917,  t h e  
l a s t  T s a r ,  N i c h o l a s  Second ,  f e l l  f r o m  power  p repar ing  . t h e  way for t h e  Bolshevik 
se izure  of power in October., 
The Bolsheviks expanded state intervention ' in capi ta l  al location and accumulation 
thereby politicizing all soc ia l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  i s s u e s .  F o r c e d  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  a n d  
collectivization polarized major segments  of the  soc ie ty  agains t  t h e  s t a t e  which could 
preserve t h e  social  order only through massive repression. In t h e  1950's t e r r o r  w a s  
r e d u c e d  u n d e r  K h r u s h c h e v l s  reforms. : '  T h e  changes  also improved t h e  standard of 
living of t h e  Soviet  working class.. , Workers also gained t h e  right t o  change thei r  job 
at will.. ' Although t h e  reform c rea ted  a semi-free labor market ,  they did no t  change 
t h e  b a s i c  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  i n  w h i c h  t h e  s t a t e  c o n t r o l l e d  c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  
accumulation.. ' 
T h i s  s t r u c t u r e  h a s  l e d  t o  w o r k e r - s t a t e  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  whenever t h e  s t a t e  has 
th rea tened  workers  established rights.. . In 1962 a 'workers '  r e v o l t  i n  N o v o c h e r k a s s k  
a g a i n s t  s t a t e - i n i t i a t e d  p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s  was brutally crushed.. : In l i t e r  reforms, the  
Soviet  leaders a t t e m p t e d  t o  rat ionalize t h e  economy by reducing reliance on  c e n t r a l  
planning while increasing t h e  ro le  of individual enterprises in  promoting eff ic iency and  
profi tabil i ty in t h e  1960's. A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e s e  " r e f o r m e d "  e n t e r p r i s e s  d r a s t i c a l l y  
reduced t h e  number of workers, improved work organization and  productivity, lowered 
costs  and  s t imulated t h e  economic in teres ts  of t h e  r e m a i n i n g  workers .  By p l a c i n g  
g r e a t e r  e m p h a s i s  'on t e c h n i c i a n s ,  e n g i n e e r s  a n d  e x p e r t s ,  s u c h  r e f o r m s  adversely 
a f fec ted  t h e  in te res t s  of lower and  middle level bureaucrats..  : More importantly,  t h e  
reforms suddenly conver ted semi-skilled workers i n t o  a "reserve army" of unemployed 
laborers. Not  surprisingly, an informal al l iance was  formed between t h e  discontented 
breaucrats  and workers in terrupt ing t h e  reforms in t h e  ea r ly  1970's (Victor Zaslavsky, 
1982, 48-52).:: 
Today t h e  Soviet working class, prevented f rom participating in decision making, 
a c c e p t s  t h e  prevailing distribution of power a s  long as t h e  prices of basic neccesit ies 
a n d  m a j o r  s e r v i c e s  r e m a i n  low,  jobs a r e  guaranteed,  and people a r e  f r e e  t o  seek 
individual ways t o  improve thei r  living s tandards  ((Zaslavsky, 1331. D e t e r i o r a t i o n  of 
t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  m a y  l e a d  t o  polarization agains t  t h e  state. .  : Given t h e  absence of 
m a r k e t  mechanism and popular control  over capi ta l  al location and accumulation,  this 
outcome remains inevitable.. : 
T o  r e d u c e  t h e  likelihood of popular confrontation wi th  t h e  s t a t e ,  Soviet leaders 
have pursued s t ra teg ies  t o  f ragment  and a tomize  t h e  population. The  rising inequalty 
within t h e  working c lass  through t h e  promotion of closed enterprises and closed cit ies 
employing skilled labor with higher pay and provision of channels of upward mobility 
f o r  h igh ly  t a l e n t e d  individuals a r e  among such devices.: ' Along with t h e  everpresent 
f e a r  of repression, these  f a c t o r s  r e d u c e  t h e  c h a n c e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  A s  a 
r e s u l t ,  m o s t  people choose individual ways of improving the i r  lives.. : Those who fail  
t o  deal  with the i r  si tuation may  resor t  t o  a lchohol ism,  a h i s t o r i c  R u s s i a n  s o l u t i o n  
predating t h e  revolution.. 
Under t h e s e  conditions, those who re jec t  t h e  inevitabil i ty of the  e x t a n t  order can 
only genera te  a segmental  conflict  which rarely succeeds  in e f fec t ing  c h a n g e ,  f o r  a 
segmenta l  conflict  can be repressed.. . Only when socie ty  is polarized and consolidated 
agains t  t h e  s t a t e ,  can effect ive  collective act ion be  anticipated.  T h e  l ike l ihood  of 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  f a c i l i t a t e d  by t h e  integration of political and 
economic s t ruc tu res  and politicization of social and economic issues.. ' 
Nicaragua 
The Nicaraguan revolution of 1979 occurred within a primarily agrarian s t ruc tu re  
t h a t  w a s  u n d e r g o i n g  s o m e  m e a s u r e  of s t a t e - s p o n s o r e d  e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  ... 
S i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  w o r l d  market  and  in ternat ional  relations in t h e  decades 
following 1950 enabled t h e  state t o  t a k e  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  e c o n o m i c  
development.. ' Despite some success, s t a t e  act iv i t ies  polarized and  politicized various 
segments  of t h e  population below t h e  compradore c lass  result ing in t h e  revolutionary 
s t r u g g l e s  of 1977-78 tha t  culminated in t h e  downfall of the  .Somoza regime in July 
The roots  of the  growing state involvement in  t h e  economy can be t r a c e d  t o  t h e  
co t ton  boom of t h e  1950's. During t h a t  p e r i o d  of g r o w t h ,  N i c a r a g u a ' s  r e a l  gross. 
domes t ic  product (GDP) increased at an average r a t e  of 9.5 percent  per year, while 
t h e  per cap i ta  COP rose f rom $170 in 1949 t o  $245 in 1955. Although t h e  economy 
e x p e r i e n c e d  s h a r p  cyclical  downswings in  t h e  l a t e  1950's and l a t e  19601s, in general 
t h e  post-war e r a  can be character ized as t h e  m o s t  d y n a m i c  per iod  i n  N i c a r a g u a ' s  
ecoiromic history..,: 
The growth of t h e  co t ton  industry did not,  however, t ake  place in  a f r e e  marke t  
se t t ing,  in  response t o  increased demand a lone .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  had n o  
d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  c o t t o n ,  which  made up only 15 percen t  of the  GNP (Thomas 
Walker, 1981, 59), t h e  state p l a y e d  a n  i m p o r t a n t  ' r o l e  in c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  
a c c u m u l a t i o n . .  In  a d d i t i o n  t o  bu i ld ing  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  infrastructure,  i t  provided 
f a v o r a b l e  ' e x c h a n g e  r a t e s ,  t a r i f f s  a n d  p r i c i n g  po l ic ies ,  a l l  of w h i c h  s t i m u l a t e d  
i n v e s t m e n t  i n  l abor - sav ing  mach inery . : .  In  1950,  N i c a r a g u a  had  l e s s  t h a n  500 
(es t imated)  t ractors ,  while by 1 9 5 5  t h e r e  w e r e  2,500. T h e  state a l s o  subs id ized  
irr igation and research projects as well a s  s torage,  processing and market ing facilities.. ' 
More importantly,  t h e  state pursued a subsidized c red i t  policy. By t h e  mid 19501s, 
c o t t o n  g r o w e r s  w e r e  r e c e i v i n g  t w o - t h i r d s  of t h e  value  of all bank c r e d i t  ( h i m - e  
Biderman 1983). Af te r  1960, t h e  Banco Nacional  e x t e n d e d  c r e d i t  o n  t h e  bas is  of 
y i e l d  w h i c h  fur ther  encouraged rationalization of production (Joseph J. Brooks, 1967, 
194). Perhaps mos t  significantly, t h e  state uti l ized t h e  National Guard t o  repress t h e  
labor force.  ... Wages were  kept low and t h e  state prevented t h e  format ion of unions 
among  t h e  majori ty of rural  workers. In t h e  19701s,  c h u r c h - r e l a t e d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
a t t e m p t e d  t o  promote workers' organizations, but t h e s e  t o o  were  brutally repressed.. . 
T h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  w e r e  i m p r e s s i v e .  In c o m b i n a t i o n ,  t h e y  w e r e  
responsible f o r  generat ing t h e  highest  yields in t h e  world for  nonirrigated land, twice  
t h e  level  of yields in  t h e  ~ .S. ,dBrooks,  ' 1967, 208). L a t e r  t h e s e  state policies were  
e x t e n d e d  t o  o t h e r  e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d  e n t e r p r i s e s  s u c h  a s  b e e f ,  sugar ,  bananas and 
i r r igated rice. T h e  sec to rs  also prospered rapidly.. 
But state allocation of cap i ta l  was biased i n  favor of large, modern f i rms  which 
l e d  t o  f u r t h e r  c o n c e n t r a t i o n .  F o r  e x a m p l e  f e w e r  t h a n  t w e n t y  e x p o r t e r s  w e r e  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a l l  c o t t o n  e x p o r t s ,  w i t h  m o s t  of t h e  t r a d e  falling t o  f ive  f i rms . , '  
Large  c a t t l e  ranchers  also benef i ted  tremendously f rom t h e  s t a t e  policies. T w e n t y -  
s e v e n  p e r c e n t  of a l l  c a t t l e  a n d  m o r e  than half of t h e  available pasture a r e a  was 
controlled by a m e r e  two  percent  of ranchers. T h e  s a m e  conditions prevailed in t h e  
sugar, tobacco and banana firms.. 
T h e  uneven  p o l i c i e s  had  a n  adverse  i m p a c t  on small  and medium-size f i rms  as 
well as t h e  rural prole tar ia t ,  m a n y  of whom w e r e  displaced. .  : While a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  i n c r e a s e d  137 p e r c e n t  f r o m  1960  t o  1977, t h e  proportion of workers 
engaged in agr icul ture  declined f rom 58  percent  t o  50 percent. In 1977, 1 6  percent  
of t h e  a g r a r i a n  l a b o r  f o r c e  w a s  u n e m p l o y e d  ( J o h n  Booth,  1982, 8 4 ) . , '  An  AID 
sponsored inquiry undertaken in 1982 concluded t h a t  if some act ions  were  not taken,  
t h e  di f ference between haves and have-nots could lead t o  social  upheavals (Biderman 
1983). Although s o m e  reforms in  s t a t e  credi t  policy and land d i s t r i b u t i o n  e m e r g e d  
ou t  of the  recommendation,  they proved t o o  l i t t l e  and  t o o  late..  
T h e  s t a t e  also promoted i n d u s t  r i a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  t h r o u g h  a pol icy of i m p o r t -  
substi tution. , '  Encouraged by t h e  al l iance fo r  progress (initiated by t h e  U.S. t o  reduce 
t h e  chance of l e f t i s t  revolutions), and t h e  C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a n  C o m m o n  M a r k e t ,  t h e  
N i c a r a g u a n  s tate t o o k  crucial  s teps  toward industrial ization in  t h e  ear ly  1960's.: In 
addition t o  building infras t ructure ,  t h e  state extended subsidized credit ,  t a x  ho l idays  
a n d  f a v o r  a b l e  exchange rates.. . Through licensing, i t  el iminated business corn petition, 
thereby providing secure  markets.  Most importantly,  workers' w a g e s  w e r e  k e p t  low 
and state repression kept t h e  labor organizations weak.. By t h e  ea r ly  1970's about 5.5' 
percent of t h e  urban workforce had been unionizedt(John Booth, 1982, 122).. ' 
~ h e s e  s t a t e  policies together  with increasing U.S. economic a id  (with t h e  Alliance 
fo r  Progress, American economic assistance m o r e  than  doubled and mili tary a id  rose 
sevenfold) generated positive results.:. The GDP increased t w o  and half t imes  between 
1960 and 1975. T h e  GDP share  of manufacturing rose  f r o m  15.6 p e r c e n t  t o  m o r e  
t h a n  2 3  p e r c e n t  by t h e  ea r ly  19703, despite t h e  loss of about 10,000 manufacturing 
jobs in t h e  ear thquake of 1972 (John Booth, .1982, 77-78).. . 
As was t h e  in  t h e  agricultural  sector,  the  state intervention in industry favored 
large  and modern enterpr ises  resulting in heavy concentration.  Of t h e  600 industrial 
plants employing f ive  or  m o r e  persons, 136 produced 72 percent  of the  to ta l  output in 
1971, and only 28 accounted fo r  3 5  percent. In con t ras t ,  13,000 s m a l l  e n t e r p r i s e s  
g e n e r a t e d  o n l y  5 percent  of the  country's industrial production (George Black, 1981, 
40).. 
T h r e e  s e g m e n t s  of t h e  Nicaraguan bourgeosie were  beneficiaries of government 
policies. T h e  f i r s t  group, t h e  Banco Nicaraguense (BANIC), h a d  i t s  o r i g i n s  a m o n g  
old-line liberal landowners and t h e  emerging c o t t o n  s e c t o r  in  t h e  1950's. ' The second 
group, t h e  Banco de  America  (BANAMERICA), was t ied  originally t o  t h e  conservative 
oligarchy.. In t h e  post war  period, both invested heavily in  manufacturing, commercial  
enterprises,  rea l  e s t a t e  and construction. T h e  third group was t h e  Somoza family and 
i t s  c l o s e s t  collaborators.: They a lso  invested heavily in modern agriculture,  industry 
and commerce.  Taking advan tage  of t h e  Cen t ra l  American Common Market's (CACM) 
r e d u c t i o n  of t r a d e  b a r r i e r s ,  t h e  Somoza family en te red  in interregional commerce,  
fishing and  fish canning, m e a t  packing, t o b a c c o  p r o d u c t s ,  s h o e s ,  r i c e  g r o w i n g  and  
processing.. . They also invested in domestic construction,  real  estate, the  mass  media, 
a u t o  products and  automobile importation., 
Although t h e  t h r e e  fact ions  converged through various joint ventures in t h e  1960's 
and ea r ly  1970ts, t h e  Somoza group always held t h e  upper hand. ..: Supported by funds 
e x t r a c t e d  f rom t h e  s t a t e  (and foriegn aid) and its autonomous e n t i  t i e s - t h e  N a t i o n a l  
Bank, T h e  N a t i o n a l  L i g h t  a n d  P o w e r  company, t h e  National Lottery,  t h e  National 
Social S e c u r i t y  I n s t i t u t e  a m o n g  o t h e r s ,  t h e  S o m o z a  f a c t i o n  w a s  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  
c o m p e t e  w i t h  i t s  t w o  rivals.;.: c o n t r o l  o v e r  s t a t e  power  enabled t h e  Somozas t o  
o p e r a t e  illegal business, c r e a t e  legal  monopolies f o r  themselves, and demand bribes in 
I 
c a s h  o r  s t o c k  i n  bus iness  in exchange fo r  licenses, concessions and con t rac t s  (John 
Booth, 1982, 80-811.. ' 
T h e  e a r t h q u a k e  of 1972 exasperated these  tendencies  of the  Somoza rule.. ' t h e  
quake cos t  t h e  lives of more  than 10,000 people and  leveled a 600-square-block a r e a  
in t h e  hear t  of Managua.. Ra ther  than helping t h e  distressed citizenry, Somoza turned 
t h e  national disaster  t o  his economic advantage..: While t h e  National Guard looted t h e  
d e v a s t e d  c o m m e r c i a l  s e c t o r  and  sold international relief materials, Somoza and  his 
a s s o c i a t e s  p o c k e t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f u n d s  d o n a t e d  f o r  r e l - i e f .  AID f u n d s  w e r e  
disproportionately used for t h e  construction of luxury housing fo r  t h e  National Guard 
officers,  while t h e  homeless poor had t o  l ive in has t i ly  c o n s t r u c t e d  wooden  s h a c k s  
(Thomas Walker, 1981, 31-32)., : Somoza surely enr iched himself.. : On arrival in Miami 
fo r  exile, Somoza t o l d  r e p o r t e r s  t h a t  h e  w a s  w o r t h  only  $100 mil l ion,  b u t  U.S..: 
government sources placed t h e  figures at $900 million (G.eorge Black, 1981, 34).. ' 
As a result,  t h e  distribution of income g r e w  m o r e  lops ided  b e t w e e n  1 9 6 0  a n d  
1970's.: T h e  upper class absorbed a growing share  of t h e  pie, while t h e  middle and  
working classes received progressively less. In 19701s, t h e  b o t t o m  half of i n c o m e  
earners  received 15 percent  of the  national income, while t h e  t o p  5 percent  received 
30 percent. . '  Government pol ic ies  f a i l e d  t o  i m p r o v e  t h e  q u a l i t y  of l i f e  f o r  m o s t  
Nicaraguans.:. Nearly half of t h e  country's housing (80 percent  in rural areas)  lacked 
indoor plumbing. T h e  average Nicaraguan had l ife expectancy of 53 years, t h e  lowest  
in  Cen t ra l  America.  Infant  morta l i ty  r a t e  w a s  t h e  s e c o n d  h i g h e s t  i n  t h e  region.  
L a c k  of p o r t a b l e  w a t e r  o u t s i d e  t h e  c i t ies  caused epidemic intest inal  diseases t h a t  
resul ted in almost one-fifth of al l  d e a t h s .  C o m p a r e d  t o  o t h e r  C e n t r a l  A m e r i c a n  
countries, t h e  Somoza government al located t h e  smal les t  sha re  of i t s  .budget on health 
and education 1 (John Booth, .1982, 85).: ' 
Bt t h e  mid-19701s, an economic crisis  had emerged .... The construction boom t h a t  
followed t h e  ear thquake pe te red  ou t  a f t e r  1974. Despite h igher  p r i c e s  f o r  c o f f e e ,  
foreign exchange declined in  response t o  decreasing value of cotton,  sugar and m e a t  
exports. By ,1977 t h e  GDP had dropped by 5 percent  and f o r e i g n  d e b t  r e a c h e d  $1 
bi l l ion f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime, representing a fourfold rise over  s ix  years.: . This led t h e  
World Bank and t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  Bank t o  q u e s t i o n  t h e i r  po l i cy  of 
e x t e n d i n g  s o f t  loans t o  Somoza.. The Nicaraguan government turned t o  U.S. private 
banks. In 1978 t a x  exempt ion  o n  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o f i t s  w a s  abo l i shed ,  p rov id ing  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  a n  e x t r a  $19 mi l l ion  i n  revenues . .  ' This policy, however, antagonized 
segments  of t h e  business community.. ' 
Government policies antagonized o ther  classes too.. ' The postquake reconstruction 
program raised t h e  work week from 48 t o  6 0  h o u r s  a n d  f r o z e  o r  c u t  w a g e s .  T o  
f inance  t h e  'war agains t  . the  FSLN t h e  government doubled mili tary expenditure which 
could be  financed by printing m o r e  money ((6.0 percent  more  t h a n  p l a n n e d  i n  ,19781.. : 
The resulting inflat ion inevitably c u t  real  wages and  salaries (George Black, 1981, 66- 
'673 and added t o  t h e  discontent of workers and all  those on fixed income. 
I 
I With t h e  e x c e p t i o n  of t h e  b i g  b o u r g e o s i e  a l l i e d  w i t h  Somoza, t h e  part icular 
I 
I 
I development exper iences  of N i c a r a g u a  h a d  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d  a l l  s o c i a l  c lasses . .  * 
c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  s o m e  Nicaraguans gradually voiced thei r  opposition aginst  t h e  regime.. 
But individual or  segmented opposition could e f f e c t  no  r e s u l t s .  And  t h e r e  w a s  n o  
s t r o n g  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  p o l i t i c a l  o rgan iza t ion  ab le  t o  rapid mobilization, since t h e  
repressive s t a t e  had p r e v e n t e d  t h e i r  f o r m a t i o n .  Thus  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  n e e d e d  t o  
consolidate i t s  fo rces  in  order  t o  become e f f e c t i v e .  T o  t h a t  e n d  t h e  S a n d a n i s t a s  
p l a y e d  a n  h i s t o r i c  r o l e  a g g r a v a t i n g  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t s ,  s e i z i n g  leadership from 
reformis t  forces,  and mobilizing t h e  masses t o  overthrow t h e  regime.. : 
By 1974 t h e  Sandinistas had been conducting a n  unsuccessful guerrilla war fa re  fo r  
more  than a decade.. . With t h e  emerging crisis, thei r  chances of s u c c e s s  i n c r e a s e d . .  
In a briliantly execu ted  ra id  on December 27, 1974, they a t t a c k e d  a reception for  t h e  
U.S. Ambassadore, Turner Shelton, at t h e  mansion of Jose  Maria P C h e m a " )  C a s t i l l o  
Quant, t h e  Minister of Agriculture, formerly linked with Somozals off ice  of security.. 
Somoza was fo rced  t o  bow t o  guerri l la demands including $2 million ransom, re lease  
of a n u m b e r  of t h e i r  p r i s o n e r s  including Daniel Ortega Saavedra, dissemination of 
thei r  communiques in La  Prensa and  i t s  broadcast  over  two  TV channels and  six radio 
stat ions,  increased wages fo r  workers and enlisted men in t h e  National Guard.. 
T h e  success of t h e  daring a t t a c k  encouraged all segments  of t h e  s o c i e t y .  T h e  
m o d e r a t e  b o u r g e o s i e  b e c a m e  m o r e  openly cr i t ica l  of . t h e  regime while t h e  working 
class revealed a s t r ik ing combativity.  In response, Somoza declared a s t a g e  of siege 
which las ted for 33 months.."The resulting repression weakened a n d  spli t  t h e  FSLN in 
t h r e e  ways. But since discontent was mounting t h e  C a r t e r  Administrat ion p r e s s u r e d  
S o m o z a  t o  l i f t  t h e  s i e g e  ...' Somoza a c t e d  accordingly on September 5, 1977. Upon 
this popular protes ts  spread rapidly.. . 
But  t h e r e  w a s  y e t  m u c h  schism within t h e  opposit'ion.. . In particular, t h e  non- 
Somoza business w a s  d i v i d e d  a n d  weak .  T h e y  l a c k e d  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  
experience t o  lead t h e  opposition.. . Some demanded democrat ic  f reedoms and minimum 
constitutional guarantees,  o the rs  went  fu r the r  and demanded t h e  removal of Somoza.. . 
Without forging a l l iance with o ther  social  groups, they could accomplish l i t t le ,  if any. 
As various political organizations within t h e  business sec to r  emerged and declined, 
the  Sandinistas sought t o  collaborate,  always rejecting reformis t  tendencies, especilly 
I t h o s e  e n c o u r a g e d  by t h e  U.S.. a n d  s e g m e n t s  of t h e  N i c a r a g u a n  b u s i n e s s ,  as 
" S o m o c i z m o  s in  S o m o z a "  o r  Somocism w i t h o u t  S o m o z a .  In  O c t o b e r  1 9 7 7 ,  1 2  
p r o m i n e n t  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  (two lawyers, two. businessmen, two  priests, an academic,  a 
writer ,  an  agronomist, an  a rche tec t ,  a banker, and a denta l  surgeon) signed a political 
d o c u m e n t  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  FSLN. T h e  pub l ic  d e c l a r a t i o n  b e s t o w e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
respectabil i ty on t h e  FSLN, in addition t o  bridging b e t w e e n  t h e  g u e r r i l l a s  a n d  t h e  
non-Somoza bourgeosie . .  With t h e  fai lure of business t o  t a k e  t h e  l ead  in what was 
rapidly becoming a mass  movement ,  a radical f a c t i o n  of t h e  FSLN, t h e  T e n d e n c i a  
I n s u r r e c t i o n a l ,  c a l l e d  f o r  i m m e d i a t e  a r m e d  insur rec t ion . .  They believed t h a t  t h e  
working classes, t h e  middle classes and t h e  church groups would support  such a policy 
and would par t ic ipate  in  a rmed  insurrection.. Thus they began forming the i r  national 
political organization, United People's Movement, in ear ly  summer of 1978. A t  t h e  
s a m e  t ime,  they proceded t o  form coalitions with l e f t  wing par t ies  and organizations. ' 
Finally th i s  f a c t i o n  of t h e  FSLN, t h e  T e n d i c i a  I n s u r r e c t i o n a l ,  t o o k  a n o t h e r  
i m p o r t a n t  s t e p  w h i c h  f u r t h e r  e n h a n c e d  i t s  popu la r i ty  and support.. This was the  
a t t a c k  on National Pa lace  on August 22, 1978. T h e  FSLN gained $10 million, f reed 
s o m e  50 political prisoners, and recieved media publicity ... . The  operation also united 
t h e  t h r e e  fact ions  together .  From then on,. they  worked intensely, along with other 
po l ica l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a n d  c h u r c h  groups ,  o r g a n i z a i n g  and  unifying t h e  f ragmented 
Nicaraguan w o r k i n g  c l a s s e s ,  a n d  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s e s  f o r  t h e  f i n a l  a s s u a l t .  T h e  
f o r m a t i o n  of t h e s e  c o a l i t i o n s  consolidated all t h e  major fo rces  agains t  t h e  regime.. : 
On t h e  basis of t h e  urban s t r ikes  and t h e  a rmed  insurrect ion of m a n y  c o n s o l i d a t e d  
communities and barrios t h e  FSLN was able t o  se ize  power f rom t h e  Somoza regime 
and  t h e  compradore class.. 
I ran 
. O u r  l a s t  c a s e  i s  t h e  I r a n i a n  revolution of 1979. Since th is  revolution i s  leas t  
understood, l e t  us invest igate  i t  in some detail.  Iran's modern industrial development 
b e g a n  a f t e r  t h e  1 9 6 3  "White  Revolut ion" .  T h e  l a n d  r e f o r m  c a r r i e d  o u t  in t h e  
fo l lowing yea r s  w e a k e n e d  t h e  p o w e r  of  l a r g e  l a n d l o r d s  a n d  a l l o w e d  t h e  S h a h  t o  
expand h i s  power.. . With i t s  m o r e  concen t r a t ed  power ,  t h e  Shah's regimk a t t e m p t e d  t o  
indus t r i a l i ze  t h e  c o u n t r y  through t h e  tiny I ranian  indus t r ia l  upper class. B u t ,  as o i l  
r e v e n u e s  i n c r e a s e d ,  t h e  state expanded i t s  own e c o n o m i c  ac t iv i t i e s  and  b e c a m e  t h e  
m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  a g e n t  of  d e v e l o p m e n t .  T h e  o i l  r e v e n u e s  g a v e  t h e  s t a t e  a n  
e x t r a o r d i n a r y  e c o n o m i c  capac i ty ,  al lowing i t  t o  e n g a g e  i n  an  aggress ive  a t t e m p t  t o  . . 
i ndus t r i a l i ze  t h e  count ry .  In c o n t r a s t  t o  w e s t e r n  states, d e p e n d e n t  on  a w i d e l y  
d i f f u s e d  t a x  b a s e ,  t h e  Shah ' s  s ta te  r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  o n  o n e  m a j o r  r e s o u r c e :  o i l  
revenues .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t ime,  t h e  cont ro l  of oil r e v e n u e s  g a v e  t h e  state a high leve l  
of e c o n o m i c  independence ,  for  it no  longer re l ied  o n  a n y  i n t e r n a l  sources  of revenues. 
T h e  e v e n t u a l  r e s u l t  of  t h i s  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  a r r a n g e m e n t  w a s  t h e  a l m o s t  t o t a l  
dominat ion  of t h e  soc i e ty  a n d  t h e  economy by t h e  state., ; 
This  does  n o t  mean ,  however,  t h a t  i n  t h e  post-1963 period Iranian s o c i e t y  l acked  
a n  u p p e r  c l a s s . .  O n  t h e  con t r a ry ,  i t  did have  s u c h  a class, consist ing of t h e  upper 
eche lon  of t h e  b u r e a c r a c y  ( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  a r m y ) ,  a s m a l l  g r o u p  of e n t r e p r e n e u r s  
e n g a g e d  i n  l a r g e - s c a l e  c o m m e r c e ,  f i n a n c e  a n d  indus t ry ,  a n d  cap i t a l i s t  landowners..  ' 
Within th i s  bloc, t h e  b u r e a c r a t i c  f r a c t i o n  held t h e  upper  hand.. ; 
But t h e  c ruc i a l  issue i s  t h a t  none  of t h e s e  f r a c t i o n s  had  . a n y  independent  power 
b a s e  v i s - a -v i s  t h e  S h a h ' s  state. T h e  S h a h  d i d  n o t  r u l e  i n  a l l i a n c e  w i t h  a n y  
i n d e p e n d e n t  s o c i a l  class.:.: N o  s e g m e n t  of  I r a n i a n  s o c i e t y  c o u l d -  l a u n c h  a major  
e c o n o m i c  unde r t ak ing  wi thout  s o m e  fo rm of i n v o l v e m e n t  o n  t h e  p a r t  of t h e  r o y a l  
f a m i l y  (Zonis, 1971, p.. 33) ...' By a n d  la rge ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of t h o s e  who ,emerged as t h e  
new barons  could d o  s o  through the i r  pol i t ical  t i e s  w i t h  t h e  r o y a l  c o u r t .  F e w  of 
t h e s e  m e n  c a m e  f r o m  s i m p l e  o r i g i n s ;  s u c h  w e r e  p e o p l e  l ike  Khayami  a n d  Sabet.. . 
A f t e r  t h e i r  in i t ia l  success,  t h e s e  "self-made" men,  w e r e  d rawn  i n t o  t h e  r o y a l  o r b i t ,  
w h e r e  t h e y  w e r e  o r d e r e d  t o  s t a r t  c e r t a i n  indus t r ia l  ventures.. ' I t  is i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  
t h a t  w h a r e v e r  t h e  o r i g i n  of t h e s e  w e a l t h y  p e o p l e ,  t h e y  a l w a y s  n e e d e d  t o  h a v e  
pol i t ica l  ties wi th  t h e  royal  c o u r t  i n  o r d e r  t o  l i n k  u p  t o  f o r e i g n  c o r p o r a t i o n s  a n d  
a s s u m e  inf luent ia l  status.: 
D e s p i t e  m a s s i v e  a c c u m u l a t i o n ,  t h i s  c l a s s  s t i l l  r e m a i n e d  v e r y  s m a l l  a n d  
economica l ly  dependen t  on  t h e  state. T h e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  dependence  of t h i s  c lass  on 
t h e  S h a h ' s  state did no t  just r e su l t  f r o m  poli t ical  factors.. ' .  T h e r e  w e r e  a l so  obvious 
e c o n o m i c  f a c t o r s  involved. S t a t e  con t ro l  ove r  oil  g a v e  t h e  Shah a powerful  m e a n s  t o  
c o n t r o l  m a j o r  a s p e c t s  of I r a n ' s  e c o n o m i c  life.. T h e  t remendous  revenues  gave  t h e  
Shah's r e g i m e  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  of managing  a v e r y  s t r o n g  state.  B u t  t h i s  s e e m i n g  
s t r e n g t h  d id  n o t  f ina l ly  t r a n s l a t e  i n t o  a s t r o n g  soc ia l  base  of suppor t  f o r  t h e  Shah's 
r u l e  t h rough  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of a l a r g e  indus t r ia l  upper .  class. T h e  s t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t  
policies  could  n o t  o v e r c o m e  t h e  h i s to r i c  weakness  of Iranian capi ta l i sm which inves ted  
a m a j o r  p a r t  of p r iva t e  cap i t a l  i n  t r a d e  a n d  r e a l  estate. T h e  h i s t o r i c  w e a k n e s s  of 
t h i s  c l a s s  w a s  n o t  o v e r c o m e  d u r i n g  t h e  P a h l a v i  rule. .  . Consequently,  t h e  Iranian 
indus t r i a l  upper c l a s s  r ema ined  s m a l l  a n d  v e r y  w e a k .  In 1 9 7 6 ,  t h e r e  w e r e  a b o u t  
50,000 indus t r ia l  employers  in  Iran.. This  was  l i t t l e  m o r e  than  1 p e r c e n t  of t h e  urban 
work  f o r c e  ((and had  increased  by less  t h a n  10,000 s ince  1966). About  t w o  th i rds  of 
t h e s e  e m p l o y e r s  w e r e  s t i l l  l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  of  f o o d  a n d  t e x t i l e . ,  
Paradoxica l ly ,  then ,  t h e  Shah's state r e m a i n e d  w e a k  s o c i a l l y  a n d  p o l i t i c a l l y ,  e v e n  
though i t  was ve ry  s t r o n g  economical ly. .  ' 
T h e  e c o n o m i c  s t r e n g t h  of  t h e  state a n d  i t s  au tonomy did not ,  however,  mean 
i m p a r t i a l i t y  o r  a b s e n c e  of i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e s  of 
I ran ian  s o c i e t y  dur ing  t h e  Shah's rule. Al though l a r g e l y  independent  of t h e  dominant  
c lasses ,  t h e  Shah's e c o n o m i c  deve lopmen t  s t r a t e g y  a lways  f avored  t h e  r i c h  o v e r  t h e  
p o o r ,  t h e  b i g  o v e r  t h e  s m a l l  i n  b o t h  indus t ry  a n d  agr icul ture ,  t h e  urban ove r  t h e  
rura l ,  a n d  t h e  ski l led ove r  t h e  unskilled. Enr iching  a minor i ty  of w e a l t h h o l d e r s  a n d  
t h e  e l i t e ,  t h e  Shah ' s  r eg ime  u l t ima te ly  f a i l ed  to broaden i t s  soc ia l  base  of support.. ' 
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  d i r e c t  and  visible a l l i ance  b e t w e e n  t h e  state a n d  t h e  upper  c l a s s  c lear ly  
revealed t h e  class na tu re  of t h e  state. T o  mos t  Iranians, th is  state was determined 
t o  serve  particular, r a the r  than general  interests..  ' These character is t ics  of t h e  s t a te ,  
along with i t s  part icular economic development policies, led t o  i t s  confrontation and 
downfall.. . L e t  us now examine t h e s e  processes.. ' 
Oil and Economic Development 
An explanation of the  political even t s  of the  1977-79 period requires an  analysis 
of t h e  economic development policies of t h e  Shah's s t a te ;  t h e  w a y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
r e s o u r c e s  w e r e  utilized; and the i r  subsequent impac t  upon various social classes and 
political interests.  This means  t h a t  i t  i s  necessary  t o  look at t h e  development of t h e  
oil sector.  .. . 
Oil revenues, the  primary state asset ,  and indeed t h e  basis of t h e  whole economy 
in t h e  1970ts, rose at a high r a t e  f rom 12 percent  of t h e  GNP (40,000 million ~ i a l s )  
in 1963 t o  over 25 percent  of t h e  GNP for 1971-72.. ' In 1973, i t  suddenly increased 
t o  1,333,300 million Rials (nearly $18 billion), providing 50 percent  of t h e  GNP; but 
by 1978 i t  slowly fe l l  back t o  1,284,900 million Rials, still  just under 35 percent  of 
t h e  GNP (Katoozian, 1980, 2571.. ' 
'As  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  of t h e  I r a n i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  quadrupled in t h e  l a s t  
quar ter  of 1973, due  t o  t h e  increase  in oil prices, t h e  S h a h  of I r a n  c a l l e d  a n e w s  
conference t o  announce t h e  sudden increase  in  t h e  wealth of t h e  nation.. . H e  declared 
f r e e  education up t o  t h e  8 th  grade, f r e e  school milk, and f r e e  higher e d u c a t i o n  f o r  
those who wished t o  se rve  t h e  government a f t e r  graduation.. ' Shortly afterwards,  t h e  
government s e t  aside t h e  f ive  year plan which was  less than one  year old, and in i t s  
p l a c e  i n t r o d u c e d  a n e w  set of objectives costing $69 billion, and thus doubling t h e  
original cost.. 
I I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t w o  y e a r s ,  t h e  I r a n i a n  e c o n o m y  w i t n e s s e d  a per iod  of 
I unprecedented boom. From March 1974 t o  March 1975, t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  s p e n t  $22 
billion. This was a huge amount; i t  almost equalled t h e  e n t i r e  e x p e n d i t u r e  of t h e  
t h r e e  p r e v i o u s  years. : '  T h e  C N P ,  which h a d  risen by 8 percent  per annurn in t h e  
19601s, rose by 14.2 percent  in 1972-73, by 30.3: percent  in 1973-74 and by 42 percent 
i n  1974-75. .. B e t w e e n  1972 a n d  1978,  t h e  C N P  g r e w  f r o m  $17.3 bi l l ion t o  a n  . 
est imated $54.6 billion; C N P  per c a p i t a  rose  f rom $450 in  1971  t o  $1,344 in  1974  
(Halliday, 1978, p. .11). 
I r an ' s  i n d u s t r i a l  g r o w t h  w a s  o n e  of t h e  h i g h e s t  a m o n g  T h i r d  World nations. 
~ a n u f a c t u r i n g  grew at an  average  of 12.3 percent  per annum f o r  t h e  .:1963-72 period.. : 
A c c o r d i n g  t o  UNIDO, t h i s  i s  a l m o s t  t w i c e  as f a s t . a s  t h e  average growth of th is  
s e c t o r  in other  developing countries. T h e  r a t e  of industrial growth fo r  t h e  decade of 
1965-75 was 15.2 pe rcen t  per annum.. '  
But Iran's economic development was highly uneven.:. The  agrarian sec to r  did not  
benef i t  f rom t h e  general  economic growth.. T h e  rising u r b a n  i n c o m e  e x p a n d e d  t h e  
demand for agricultural commodities.. ' But t h e  Iranian agrarian sec to r  could not m e e t  
th is  rising demand. T h e  inability of t h e  peasantry t o  t a k e  advantage of t h e  si tuation 
and t r y  t o  increase  supply had nothing t o  do wi th  t h e  myth  of "the peasant lack of 
response". Rather ,  t h e  fa i lure  of t h e  agrar ian s e c t o r  was due part ly t o  technical  and 
I 
I i n s t i t u t i o n a l '  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  a n d  p a r t l y  t o  a d e l i b e r a t e  neglect  of agriculture in t h e  
government development s t ra tegy  ...  
T h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  const ra ints  were  .part ly rooted in t h e  way t h e  land reform had 
been carr ied out. E i r s t ,  t h e  l a n d  r e f o r m  did  n o t  c o v e r  one-half  of t h e  v i l l a g e  
f a m i l i e s ,  e x c l u d i n g  t h e m  as r e c i p i e n t s  of l a n d  s i n c e  t h e y  l a c k e d  a n y  f o r m a l  
sharecropping agreements  with the i r  landowners. Not  receiving any land,  t h i s  g r o u p  
w a s  qu ick ly  t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  a r u r a l  p r o l e t a r i a t  t h a t  l i v e d  i n  ex t reme  poverty. 
Second, of t h e  other  half which received any land, a b o u t  7 5  p e r c e n t  o b t a i n e d  l e s s  
t h a n  t h e  s e v e n  h e c t a r e s  needed fo r  subsistence agriculture.. Third, because roughly 
half of t h e  bes t  land was never subjected t o  redistribution, most  of t h e  d i s t r i b u t e d  
land, due  t o  i t s  quality and quanti ty,  was barely adequa te  for  cultivation. This was a 
result  of the  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  government allowed t h e  absentee  landlords t o  se lec t  f reely  
which par t  of the i r  land would be  subject  t o  sa le  (Hooglund, 1980 and 1981, p.! 1%. ' 
A b s e n t e e  l a n d l o r d s  ( a b o u t  2 percent  of t h e  landowners in 1960) who owned 55 
percent  of t h e  a rab le  land were  a b l e  t o  keep abou t  half of thei r  holdings ( t h i s  w a s  
a b o u t  20 mil l ion a c r e s  o u t  of a t o t a l  of 42 million acres)  ...- The majori ty of t h e  
absen tee  landlords managed . thei r  arable  land through t h e  sharec ropp ing  s y s t e m  t h a t  
o p e r a t e d  i n .  t h e  pre- land reform period.. . Only a minority of these  landlords, whose 
holdings averaged 250 o r  more  acres ,  engaged in capital ist  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  h i r e d  w a g e  
laborers, used machinery and  o ther  production inputs such a s  fertilizers.; : 
Hoivever, th is  did no t  lead t o  any major transformation of agricultural  production.. 
~ e a l '  investment in  agricultural  machinary and equipment during 1963-71 grew by 6.7 
percent  per annum, while t h a t  of t o t a l  investment  grew by 20 percent; and t h e  share  
of a g r i c u l t u r e  i n  G N P  d e c l i n e d  f r o m  16.6 percent  in 1963 t o  5 . l .pe rcen t  in  1971 
(Walton, 1980, p.. 281) ... 
T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t  s t ra tegy a lmos t  total ly neglected t h e  agricultural  
sec to r  as compared t o  t h e  industrial sector.  T h e  government  c a r r i e d  o u t  t h e  l a n d  
reform and l e f t  t h e  peasants t o  the i r  own, as though t h e  formal  transfer of land t i t l e  
would generate  p e a s a n t  i n c e n t i v e s  c a u s i n g  m i r a c l e s  in a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  ... 
G o v e r n m e n t  i n v e s t m e n t ,  on t h e  whole, was low in  th is  sector..  ' But wherever t h e r e  
was extensive  state investment  in t h e  form of land improvement,  machinery, t rac tors ,  
l e v e l i n g ,  i r r i g a t i o n ,  f e r t i l i z e r s ,  e tc . ; the  r e s u l t s  s e e m s  t o  h a v e  b e e n  a t  l e a s t  
satisfactory.  But such resources could not be used by t h e  m a j o r i t y  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c e r s  s i n c e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  e x t e n d e d  i t s  low in te res t  r a t e  c red i t  only t o  big 
producers. Rich landlords paid less than 5 percen t  in teres t  while o thers  had t o  pay 
m o r e  t h a n  1 4  p e r c e n t . .  ' T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  decision, in t h e  197OVs, t o  pay a grea te r  
I a t t en t ion  t o  t h e  agricultural  sec to r  c a m e  t o o  late. .. 
A s  o i l  r e v e n u e s  r o s e ,  a n d  f a c e d  w i t h  g r o w i n g  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s h o r t a g e s ,  t h e  
government began importing and  subsidizing food items.. : For  political reasons, through 
i t s  generous subsidies, t h e  government kept  food prices down. By 1977, t h e  costs  t o  
Iranian f a r m e r s  for  production of a ton of wheat o r  r ice  were  g rea te r  than t h e  prices 
of these  goods in  t h e  urban re ta i l  marke t  (Hooglund, 1980). . . Conseqently, agricultural  
p r o d u c t i o n  d e c l i n e d  e v e n  f u r t h e r . . :  The final result,  at t h e  end  of the  period, was 
unfor tunate  and sadden ing .  ' N e v e r  b e f o r e  h a d  t h e  c o u n t r y  b e e n  s o  r i c h  a n d  i t s  
peasants .so poor and incapable of feeding t h e  people.. : 
A country  t h a t  prior t o  i t s  land reform impor ted  v e r y  f e w  food  p r o d u c t s  now 
became o n e  of the  leading importers  of food and  agricultural  products in t h e  Middle 
East. ~ c c o r d i n ~  t o  Burn a n d  D u m o n t ,  by 1978  I ran ' s  i m p o r t a t i o n  of f o o d  w a s  
i n c r e a s i n g  at  1 4  p e r c e n t  per annum.. ' A t  this  rate,  they maintained, Iran would be 
importing half of i t s  food by 1985. Instead of a t  l e a s t  c a u t i o n i n g  t h e  g o v e n m e n t  
agains t  such a policy, the  International Bank for  Reconstruction and Development, in 
1974, advised t h e  govenment that: "Iran s h o u l d  n o t  c o n s i d e r  i t s e l f  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  w o r l d  supp l ies  a n d  p r i c e s  if  i t  a d o p t s  a logical long-term import  
policy ..... Iran can in addition impor t  many agricultural  products at a lower cos t  than 
i t  would t a k e  t o  produce them locally .. .;l:rnports could thus serve  t o  reduce consumer 
pricestt , (Burn and Dumont, 1978).. : 
The impac t  of these  policies on agr icul ture  was very serious.. ' The deterioration 
of agricultural  conditions led  t o  peasant  m i g a t i o n .  From mid sixties approximately a 
q u a r t e r  of a mi l l ion  p e a s a n t s  l e f t  f o r  c i t i e s .  .. T h i s  i n  t u r n  fu r the r  worsend t h e  
si tuation of t h e  rural  sector.  This was because t h e  young l e f t  t h e  countryside and a 
g r e a t  d e a l  of t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  irr igation canals, Ghanats, dried up e i the r  because of 
disrepair, l ack  of upkeep or because of t h e  sinking watertable,  w h i c h  r e s u l t e d  f r o m  
u n c o n t r o l l e d  pumping by machines belonging t o  r ich farmers,  agri-business, or  s t a te -  
run f a r m  cooperatives. Deprived of t h e  energy of i t s  most a c t i v e  and ab le  members,  
t h e  younger generation, t h e  agra r ian  socie ty  was unable, for  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  in  t h e  
Iranian history, t o  uti l ize much of i t s  resources., '  Also for  t h e  f i r s t  t ime,  large  pieces 
of agrar ian land were  l e f t  fallow, with no o n e  tending or even f ight ing over rights of 
possession in  many par t s  of the  country.:. 
T h e  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  England  i s  instructive.:  Whereas  in England, according t o  
Thomas More, "sheep ate men" in  t h e  enclosure movement,  in  I r a n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
d e v e l o p m e n t  po l ic ies  a t e  b o t h  s h e e p  a n d  men., In England th i s  was a process o f .  
" p r i m i t i v e  a c c u m u l a t i o n "  w h i c h  s e p a r a t e d  t h e  p r o d u c e r s  f r o m  t h e i r  m e a n s  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  result ing in rapid economic development.. . But in con t ras t  t o  t h e  British 
experience,  whose history of expropriation, accord ing  t o  Marx  (1967, p. 71 5 ) ,  "was 
wri t ten  i n  t h e  annals of mankind i n  l e t t e r s  of blood and fire", t h e  Iranian experience 
of peasant e x p r o p r i a t i o n  n e i t h e r  invo lved  v i o l e n c e  and  b loodshed ,  n o r  e c o n o m i c  
development, even though i t  enta i led  pain and suffering. 
T h e  p e a s a n t  e x o d u s  e x a c e r b a t e d  a l r e a d y  e x i s t i n g  u rban  problems:  hous ing  
shortages, speculation, and growing inflation.. . These problems along with government 
policies widened t h e  income gap in society. In a study on income d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a b o r  Organizat ion concluded t h a t  t h e  Gini Coeff ic ient  (a measure  of 
income inequality) fo r  Iran in 1969-70 was higher than any country i n  t h e  E a s t  a n d  
Southeast  Asia, considerably higher than in Western countries and probably a s  high o r  
higher than  in Lat in  American countr ies  fo r  which d a t a  a r e  available., 
In Iran, the re  were  many f a c t o r s  responsible fo r  t h e  growth of income inequality 
in  t h e  urban sector.  The  following a r e  s o m e  of t h e  m o s t  s t r i k i n g  c a u s e s .  F i r s t  
g o v e r n m  e n t  i n d u s t r i a l  po l i c ies  h ighly  f a v o u r e d  t h e  m o n o p o l i e s  i n  t h e  i m p o r t -  
substi tution sector.  A s  Keddie has noted, profits of 30 t o  50 p e r c e n t  w e r e  n o r m a l  
and profi ts  of 100 t o  200 percent  were  not  unknown in the  industrial sector  (Keddie, 
1979, P.. 21). Second, t h e  capi ta l  in tensive  n a t u r e  of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  
which used mostly skilled labor, c r e a t e d  a labor aristocracy and fur ther  s t ra t i f i ed  t h e  
labor fo rce  (this also adversely a f fec ted  medium size capi ta l  s ince  i t  prevented them 
f r o m  i n v e s t i n g  i n  t h e  m o s t  profi table sector).. : Third, as is natural ,  t h e  banks only 
loaned t o  those  who could prove t h a t  they could afford  t o  re tu rn  what  they borrowed; 
this type of policies always opera te  t o  t h e  disadvantage of t h e  poorer segment  of the  
society. Fourth, peasant migration increased t h e  quanti ty of t h e  unskilled work force, 
intensifying t h e  r a t e  of urban inequality.. : Fifth,  t h e  government set a ceiling on t h e  
. profit  r a t e  of t h e  tradit ional  middle class at f o u r t e e n  percent. Six, r i s i n g  i n f l a t i o n  
f u n c t i o n e d  t o  t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  of t h e  s o c i a l  classes t h a t  lived on fixed incomes.. 
Finally, government development policies ignored t h e  na t iona l  m i n o r i t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
the  Kurds, giving r i se  t o  regional inequlities.. ' 
Thus t h e  Shah's r eg ime  fa i led  t o  t r a n s f o r m  p o s i t i v e l y  t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  of 
Iranian socie ty  in such a way t h a t  i t  could remain s t rong and  independent of oil and 
t h e  world market.  By t h e  end of t h e  Shah's rule, more  than half of t h e  labor  force  
w a s  s t i l l  e m p l o y e d  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  c l a i m i n g  l e s s  than .  10 percent  of t h e  national 
. . 
income. The  industrial upper c lass  remained t i n i  .(abput 1.04 p e r c e n t  of t h e  u rban  
work force) but possessed a disproportionate s h a r e  of t h e  wea l th  of t h e  nation.. What 
actual ly  took place in  Iran was not  genuine and independent e c o n o m i c  . d e v e l o p m e n t ,  
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  o r  m o d e r n i z a t i o n ;  i t  was ra the r  rapid economic growth with t h e  
. establishment of s o m e  enclave industrial apparatuses  highly d e p e n d e n t  o n  t h e  world  
marke t  and  without adequa te  backward or  forward linkages t o  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  Iranian 
economy. Obviously,. a n  historic opportunity had been missed.. ' 
T h e  m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  s t r u c t u r a l  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  was t h e  state penetration and 
politicization of t h e  economy. A t  t h e  end of t h e  period, t h e  s tate i t s e l f  w a s  t h e  
m a j o r  w e a l t h h o l d e r :  i t s  o i l  c l a i m e d  m o r e  t h a n  a third of the  country's national 
income, i t  also owned all t h e  o ther  sources of energy and  minerals; it owned all t h e .  
l a r g e  m o d e r n  i n d u s t r i e s ,  m o s t  of transport ,  communications, banking and  insurance; 
t h e  s t a t e  also owned a sizeable number of t h e  f a r m s  and  agri-businesses. T h e  whole 
private  s e c t o r  seems  t o  have claimed less  than 20 p e r c e n t  of t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n c o m e  
(Katoozian, 1980, p...370).. 
T h e  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  b e c o m e  t h e  p r i m e  e c o n o m i c  power  and  t h e  vehicle for  
dispersing and distr ibuting t h e  new wealth; i t  had increasingly become a visible actor ,  
p lay ing  a m o s t  crucia l  role in t h e  economic development of t h e  country. ... However, 
t h e  government could no t  continue t o  increase  i t s  e x p e n d i t u r e  as it had e x p e c t e d . . '  
C o n t i n u e d  world-wide r e c e s s i o n ,  a mi ld  European  winter, and a relat ively modest  
increase  in t h e  OPEC price of oil soon reduced oil p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  oil  r e v e n u e s  i n  
Iran.. Already by December of 1975, oil production was running twenty  percent below 
t h e  s a m e  period one  year ear l ier  .(Gr-aham 1979, p. 97). By 1978, oil revenues slowly 
f e l l  f r o m  1,333,300 R i a l s  i n  1973  (supplying 50 percent  of t h e  GNP) t o  1,284,900 
mil l ion R i a l s ,  s l i g h t l y  l e s s  t h a n  35 p e r c e n t  of C N P  ( ~ a t o o z i a n ,  1980, p.. 2571.: 
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  by m i d  1 9 7 6 ,  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e  e x c e e d e d  i t s  r e v e n u e s ,  
precipitat ing a fiscal  crisis; soon t h e  Iranian government had t o  b o r r o w  f u n d s  f r o m  
international sources.. : Some commercia l  banks, due t o  heavy borrowing, had t o  turn  
t o  t h e  in ternat ional  m a r k e t  f o r  short-term funds even  sooner  t h a n  t h e  government . .  
But ,  d e s p i t e  a l l  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s h o r t f a l l s ,  o v e r  t h i s  period commercia l  banks were  . 
allowed t o  maintain a l iberal  credi t  policy as t h e  money supply kep t  increasing at a 
r a t e  of sixty percent  per annum.. . 
T h e r e f o r e ,  by mid-1975, t h e  economy was ou t  of control.. Shortages led  t o  a 
price increase  and a high r a t e  of inflation'. In o rder  t o  reduce th i s  inflation ra te ,  t h e  
IMF miss ion i n  Iran advised t h e  government t o  reduce t h e  level  of i t s  expenditures.. . 
But Iranian officials  ignored t h e  advice, blaming t h e  imported inflat ion for  t h e  rapid 
i n c r e a s e  i n  p r i c e s  ( G r a h a m  1979,  p.. .85)...' T h e  high r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  l e d  t h e  
govenment t o  control  prices on t h e  one  hand, and increase  t h e  volume of imports  ((by 
l i f t i n g  t h e  t a r i f f s )  on t h e  other.. As f a r  as t h e  imports  a r e  concerned, neither had 
t h e  Iranian ports t h e  facil i t ies t o  handle t h e  i n c r e a s e d  i m p o r t s ,  nor  w a s  t h e r e  a n  
adequa te  in f ras t ruc tu re  t o  satisfy t h e  demands of th is  suddenly hyperactive economy. 
The bott lenecks c r e a t e d  by t h e  lack of facil i t ies in  t h e  ports, and t h e  transportation 
inadequacies, led t o  t h e  lining up of about  200 ships at a t i m e  in t h e  ports t o  unload 
thei r  cargo with an  average wait ing t i m e  of 160 days  (walton 1980)..:This l ed  t o  t h e  
was te  of a l o t  of resources and imported goods.. ' 
T h e  g o v e r n m  en  t price control  policy had far-reaching and g rea te r  consequences..' . 
T h e  favorable  conditions provided f o r  industry by t h e  government and t h e  construction 
boom made  possible by t h e  explosion of oil production allowed a high r a t e  of return 
f o r  those  who could t a k e  advantage of t h e  opportunities. A s  i t  w a s  n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  
profi ts  of th i r ty  t o  f i f t y  percent seemed  t o  be normal,  and profi ts  of one hundred t o  
two  hundred percent were  not unknown in t h e  industrial  sec to r  . ( ~ . e d d i e  1979, p.. 21)., 
Such high r a t e s  of profi t  contributed t o  t h e  high r a t e  of inflation.. I t  was under such 
cond i t ions  t h a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  d e c i d e d  t o  i m p o s e  p r i c e  c o n t r o l s  a n d  l a u n c h  a 
c a m  paign a g a i n s t  "prof i teer ing" .  In August 1975, t h e  government rolled back t h e  
prices of 16,000 i t e m s  t o  their  January 1974 levels. I t  set t h e i r  p r o f i t  r a t e  a t  1 4  
p e r c e n t  whi le  t h e  inflat ion ra te ,  according t o  t h e  government's own reports, was at 
l eas t  twice  t h a t  amount.  Anyone who violated t h e  price controls was t o  be arrested.. 
However, the  government decision t o  control  prices was carr ied out  at t h e  re ta i l  
m a r k e t  level  where  merchan ts  a n d  s h o p k e e p e r s  o p e r a t e d ,  w i t h  no c o n t r o l  a t  t h e  
f a c t o r y  l e v e l ,  w h e r e  commodi t i es  were  produced and  priced, and no control  of t h e  
f e w  giant  importers.  S o  t h e  na tu re  of t h e  campaign was very uneven. As a result,  
v e r y  f e w  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  w e r e  a r res ted  in t h e  course  of this campaign and o f ten  t h e  
names prosecuted were  outsiders, such  as Elghanian, a Jewish industrial ist ,  o r  H a b i b  
Sabet,  a member  of t h e  Baha'i community who s tayed  in  Paris, never returning home 
a f t e r  t h e  government summoned him f o r  profiteering.. 
T h e  i m p a c t  of t h i s  campaign on t h e  tradit ional  middle class, namely merchants  
and  shopkeepers, was entirely different.  In t h e  f i r s t  f e w  days of t h e  campaign, t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  i m m e d i a t e l y  a r r e s t e d  7 ,750 s h o p k e e p e r s  (Augus t  8, 1 9 7 5 ,  K a y h a n  
In te rna t iona l ) . .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  Ministery of t h e  Interior, by t h e  end of t h e  year 
1977 (approximately a year before  t h e  revolution) 20,000 s h o p k e e p e r s  had  b e e n  pu t  
i n t o  jail.. . Moreover ,  a r e p o r t  by Et te laat ,  one of the  two  main daily newspapers, 
indicates  t h a t  by t h e  end of October  1977, over 109,800 o u t  of a t o t a l  of 200,000 
shopkeepers in  Tehran c i ty  had somehow violated t h e  price controls; and a l l  of these  
people had f i les  in t h e  cour t  pending investigation ( (Et te laat  5 Aban 1356). T h e  to ta l  
number of shopkeepers violating t h e  price controls for  t h e  whole country was 220,000 
by t h e  fa l l  of ..I978 (Et te laat  4 Mehr  1357; S e p t e m b e r  26,1975).. : C l e a r l y ,  i t  had 
b e c o m e  e x t r e m l y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  m o s t  of t h e  p e o p l e  i n  t h i s  sec to r  t o  do buisiness 
without violating t h e  regulations.. 
T h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  middle class could not  avoid t h e  emerging conflict  by observing 
t h e  price control  guidelines set by t h e  state. T h a t  m e a n t  s a c r i f i c i n g  t h e i r  own 
interes ts  and rights.: In due course, t h e  crisis  of revenue absorption, itself resulting 
f rom t h e  crisis of production ((originating in t h e  inadequacies of t h e  productive forces  
a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t o  m e e t  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  demands), was carr ied in to  t h e  realm of 
politics. This process occurred through t h e  government "anti-profi teerin g" c a m p a i g n  
agains t  merchan ts  and shopkeepers.: 
T o  s u m  up, a s  t h e  oi l  revenues increased, t h e r e  was fu r the r  integration of t h e  
s t a t e  i n t o  t h e  economy. T h e  inc reased  oi l  r e v e n u e s  a l s o  i n t e n s i f i e d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
inflat ion in al l  econmic sectors..  . The cen t ra l  cause  of this demand pull inflation was, 
i n  t h e  f i r s t  place, t h e  uneven development of t h e  oil sector,  with minimal backward 
and forward linkages t o  t h e  r e s t  of the  economy.. The uneven sec to ra l  development 
resulted in  t h e  crisis of revenue absorption, leading t o  a high r a t e  of i n f l a t i o n  ( a n d  
s p e c u l a t i o n ) ,  a c r i s i s  which necess i ta ted s o m e  measure  of price control.. The price 
c o n t r o l s  set t h e  s t a g e  f o r  a r e v o l u t i o n a r y  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  t h e  
tradit ional  middle class.. . 
The  tradit ional  middle class, even  though on t h e  decline, w a s  s t i l l  a l a r g e  and  
p o w e r f u l  c lass . . :  In  urban areas,  i t  consti tuted a lmos t  a quar ter  of t h e  work force.. 
More importantly,  i n  addit ion t o  its c o m m e r c i a l  n e t w o r k s ,  t h i s  . c l a s s  h a d  r e t a i n e d  
s o m e  of i t s  l inks  w i t h  t h e  mosque.. Actually, cer ta in  members  of this class st i l l  
p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  m o s q u e s  a n d  s u p p o r t e d  i t  t h r o u g h  t h e i r  r e l i g i o u s  t a x e s .  A s  a 
c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e y  c o u l d  utilize t h e  mosque as thei r  support base  against  t h e  Shah, 
especially since t h e r e  some cler ics  in  mosques who, following A y a t o l l a h  K hom e in ie ,  
o p p o s e d  . t h e  Shah.. . T h e i r  m o b i l i z a t i o n  e v e n t u a l l y  brought t h e  working c lass  (blue 
collar and white collar), adveresly a f f e c t e d  by t h e  rising inflation, a n d  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
m i n o r i t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  autonomy seeking Kurds experiencing uneven development, 
in to  a coalition in t h e  fa l l  of .1978. . The  consolidated forces  w e r e  eventually ab le  t o  
overthrow t h e  Shah in  t h e  February of 1979. 
Conclusion 
T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  has had a s t rong  industrial upper class t h a t  relied largely on 
t h e  m a r k e t  mechanism t o  o p e r a t e  t h e  e c o n o m y .  R e j e c t i n g  s tate i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  
c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  a c c u m u l a t i o n ,  t h i s  c l a s s  g e n e r a t e d  t r e m e n d o u s  economic  
development toward t h e  end  of t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  A t  t h e  s a m e .  t i m e ,  t h e  
problems caused by th i s  development gave rise t o  popular pressures in favor  of some 
state control  of t h e  economy. But state intervention remained very l imited until t h e  
decade of depression.. . During t h e  depression, part ly because of popular struggles and 
parly due  t o  t h e  economic crisis, t h e  state i n i t i a t e d  s o m e  r e f o r m s  w h i c h  a f f e c t e d  
c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  a c c u m u l a t i o n ,  a s s i s t i n g  c e r t a i n  large  f i r m s  while adversely 
a f fec t ing  f i rms  l e f t  o u t  of t h e  d e a l ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s m a l l  ones .  U l t i m a t e l y  bus iness  
I 
succeeded in having s o m e  of the  re fo rms  revoked, reducing government intervention in 
marke t  processes. In  t h e  19401s, t h e  A m e r i c a n  upper  c l a s s  a s s a u l t e d  t h e  l a b o r  
1 - m o v e m e n t  by d e p o l i t i c i z i n g  unions through t h e  Taft-Hartly Act.. The outcome has 
been  s u p r e m e  cap i t a l i s t  ru l e  i n  t h e  U.S.. a n d  t h e  exclusion of t h e  working c l a s s  f r o m  
t h e  e x e r c i s e  of poli t ical  power.. ' During  t h e  r e c e n t  crisis,  A m e r i c a n  employers  w e r e  
a b l e  t o  l a y  off mass ive  numbers  of workers  w i thou t  f a c i n g  a n y  s igni f icant  challenge..  
T h e  m a r k e t  was  l a rge ly  b lamed f o r  unemployment. .  Even had  s t r o n g  p ro te s t  s u r f a c e d  
aga ins t  t h e  layoffs ,  r e f o r m ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  revolut ion,  would l ikely h a v e  emerged..  
In Russia,  in con t r a s t ,  t h e  soc ia l  s t r u c t u r e  w a s  vulnerable  t o  co l l ec t ive  a c t i o n  a n d  
revolut ion.  Toward  t h e  e n d  of t h e  n ine t een th  cen tu ry ,  t h e  weakness  of t h e  Russian 
indus t r ia l  bourgeoisie  l e d  t o  state in t e rven t ion  i n  cap i t a l  a l loca t ion  and  accumulat ion. .  
Th i s  s t r a t e g y  n o t  only pol i t ic ized  soc ia l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  issues,  undermining  t h e  m a r k e t  
mechanism,  but  m o r e  impor t an t ly ,  polarized s o c i e t y  aga ins t  t h e  state and  i t s  nar row 
base  of support .  By 1917, t h e  deve lopmen t  policies  had  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d  a l l  t h e  
m a j o r  s o c i a l  classes i n  Russia.. T h e  soc ia l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  cr i s i s  of 1917 consol ida ted  
a l l  t h e s e  c l a s ses  aga ins t  t h e  state cu lmina t ing  t o  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  a n d  t h e  B o l s h e v i k  
se i zu re  of power.. 
T h e  B o l s h e v i k s  s t e p p e d  u p  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  c a p i t a l  a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  
accumula t ion ,  t he reby  poli t icizing soc ia l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  issues a n d  f u r t h e r  undermining 
t h e  m a r k e t  m e c h a n i s m . . :  A s  a c o n s e q u e n c e ,  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  state a n d  
popular f o r c e s  has  e r u p t e d  whenever  t h e  gove rnmen t  has  c h a l l e n g e d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  
r igh t s  of s igni f icant  soc ia l  groups.. ' P r i m a r i l y  b e c a u s e  of t h i s  d i r e c t  confronta t ion ,  t h e  
state w a s  unable  t o  e n f o r c e  i t s  r e f o r m s  t o  i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c t i v i t y . .  M a s s i v e  w o r k e r  
l a y o f f ,  a c h i e v e d  b y  A m e r i c a n  c a p i t a l i s t s ,  c o u l d  n o t  be c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  t h e  Soviet  
Union. Because  soc i a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  i ssues  a r e  highly p o l i t i c i z e d ,  t h e  s tate i n  t h e  
p o s t - S t a l i n i s t  period h a s  a t t e m p t e d  t o  avoid  policies  t h a t  l e a d  t o  confrontat ion. .  A t  
t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  i t  ha s  devised mechanisms t o  f r a g m e n t  t h e  populat ion t h u s  r e d u c i n g  
t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of consolidation.. T h e s e  policies h a v e  been  r e l a t ive ly  successful.. . T h e  
s e g m e n t a l  con f l i c t  t h a t  e m e r g e s  c a n  b e  kep t  under  control.. 
I n  N i c a r a g u a  a n d  I r a n  r e v o l u t i o n s  o c c u r r e d  under s imi lar  s t r u c t u r a l  conditions.. 
Although t h e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  d i f f e r e d  i n  t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  l e v e l s  of e c o n o m i c  
development, both governments pursued similar development strategies..  Each regime 
took in i t ia t ives  t o  .promote economic development through state intervention in capi ta l  
al location and  accumulation.. . Like Tsarist  Russia; these  policies politicized economic 
issues and  eventually polarization soc ie ty .  T h e  n a r r o w  b a s e  of s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e s e  
regimes made  t h e m  extremely vulnerable t o  collective act ion and challenge.. . As long 
as  opposition was segmented,  repression could maintain t h e  exist ing rule .  O n c e  t h e  
c r i s e s  d e e p e n e d  and  conflicts  intensified, popular struggles were  consolidated agains t  
t h e  state. The  opposition could no longer be confined t o  underground r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
organizations, and revolutions became inevitable.. 
In Nicaragua, t h e  leading role was played by t h e  Sandinistas who relied largely on 
w o r k e r - p e a s a n t  suppor t . :  T h e i r  r e v o l u t i o n  h a s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  of f u n d a m e n t a l l y  
transforming Nicaraguan society. In Iran, t h e  tradit ional  middle class, allied with t h e  
c l e r g y ,  w a s  i n  t h e  f o r e f r o n t  of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  i n  t h e  struggles against  t h e  Shah.. 
Merchant  mobilization centered in t h e  mosques enabled t h e  c lergy t o  a s s u m e  power  
and establish a theocra t i c  regime.. 
T h i s  b r i e f  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  f o u r  c a s e s  r e v e a l s  t h a t  a high l e v e l  of state 
involvement in capi ta l  allocation and accumulation increases  t h e  l ikel ihood of s o c i a l  
revolution.. Social revolutions occur when both in tegrat ion and consolidation a r e  high.. 
Russia in 1917 and  I r a n .  a n d  N i c a r a g u a  in  1 9 7 9  a r e  r e v e a l i n g  exemples . .  . Where  
consolidation is high but integration i s  low reform may t a k e  place., The re fo rms  of 
t h e  1930's in t h e  United S t a t e s  is an example  of th is  case. Inaction becomes highly 
likely when both integration and consolidation a r e  low.. ' The United Sta tes  today f i t s  
th is  situation. F ina l ly ,  :in s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  t h e  l e v e l  of i n t e g r a t i o n  is high b u t  
c o n s o l i d a t i o n  i s  low,  t h e  result  i s  segmented conflict.. The Soviet Union and many 
Third World societies a r e  experiencing such conflicts  today.. : 
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